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Abstract
Part I of this Note provides an overview of Internet censorship and international law, including
the different approaches and theories behind Internet censorship. Part I.A discusses the development of the ICCPR and its application to the Internet. Next, Part I.B-D provides an in-depth
overview of the Internet censorship models of three different countries: the United States, the
United Kingdom, and China. Part II examines each country’s Internet censorship model under
Article 19 of the ICCPR, considering Article 19(3)’s three-part test and requirements established
by recent UN reports interpreting them. The analysis will also examine each country’s copyright
laws under Article 19. In Part III, this Note argues that due to the idiosyncrasies of each country’s
Internet censorship policy and new challenges presented by intellectual property laws, Article 19
of the ICCPR by itself does not provide a clear analysis of a country’s Internet policy. Article 19
should be supplemented with parts of Professor Bambauer’s framework. The culturally-neutral
criterion of the framework mitigates the difficulty of analyzing and comparing countries with different cultural norms and moral values. Moreover, the proposed metric also allows for analysis
of indirect chilling effects caused by intellectual property laws. This Note concludes that supplementing Article 19 with the framework proposed by Professor Bambauer is a positive step towards
creating a global standard of Internet regulation.
KEYWORDS: International Law, Internet Censorship, ICCPR, Artcile 19, Internet policy, United
Nations
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INTRODUCTION
Every day, a courier begins his route and enters a busy and
seemingly endless highway. As he drives, he observes different
passing exits. Some exits are patrolled by watchdogs, while towers
and formidable walls loom over others. As he enters different exits,
he is stopped and examined by each post differently. Some let him
pass through freely, some cautiously examine him, and others turn
him around without any explanation. This occurs billions of times a
day. This is the Internet.
Few if any developments in information technology have had
such an effect on society as the creation of the Internet.1 Moreover,
the advent of Internet social media in particular has provided users
with an unprecedented level of communication.2 The expansive reach
of social media has played a key role, for example, in coordinating
mass protests and keeping the international community informed
about situations where journalists have limited access.3 Recognizing
1 See, e.g., Mike Lata, How the Internet Revolutionized Human Interactivity, EXAMINER
(Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/article/how-the-Internet-revolutionized-humaninteractivity (describing the Internet’s influence on human interaction); Courtney Myers, How
the Internet is Revolutionizing Education, THE NEXT WEB (May 14, 2011), http://
thenextweb.com/insider/2011/05/14/how-the-Internet-is-revolutionizing-education/ (describing
how the Internet has shifted education paradigms).
2. See Karan Chopra, The Effects of Social Media on How We Speak and Write, SOCIAL
MEDIA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2103), http://socialmediatoday.com/karenn1617/1745751/effectssocial-media-how-we-speak-and-write (describing how the Internet has not only shaped the
way people communicate, but has also transformed our concept of communicating); Lata,
supra note 1 (noting that the unprecedented, global reach of the Internet has spurred
government intervention).
3. See, e.g., Mercedes Bunz, In Haiti Earthquake Coverage, Social Media Gives Victim a
Voice, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2010/jan/14/
socialnetworking-haiti (discussing how social media has played a pivotal role in news
reporting during periods of traditional media blackouts); Sam Gustin, Social Media Sparked,
Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/
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the significance of the Internet as an avenue for expression, scholars
and UN specialists posit that Article 19 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) implies a right to Internet
access.4 The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty that commits its State
party members to respect specific civil and political rights of
individuals.5 Article 19 of the ICCPR (“Article 19”) establishes a
qualified right to freedom of expression.6 However, the expansion of
this sixty-year-old international treaty to the Internet comes with
certain difficulties.7
The border-defying aspects of the Internet raise an international
governance problem on a global scale.8 Countries are exercising
increased control over internal Internet activity, specifically through
the use of censorship.9 Censorship occurs when a government body
directly or indirectly prevents communication between a willing
speaker and a willing listener through regulations or control.10
Moreover, governments justify their restrictions based on a variety of
norms.11 For example, China justifies its extensive Internet
restrictions for the purposes of maintaining social stability and

02/egypts-revolutionary-fire/ (reporting social media’s significant influence on the Egyptian
Revolution of 2011).
4. See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing scholars’ interpretations of Article 19 to imply a right
to Internet access).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
6. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19.
7. See infra Part II (examining the selected country’s model of Internet governance under
Article 19); infra Part III (arguing that Article 19 is insufficient to deal with the current
systems of Internet censorship).
8. See infra Part I.B-D (describing several countries’ different Internet censorship
models).
9. See infra Part I.B-D (discussing attempts of government regulations of the Internet in
selected countries).
10. For the purposes of this Note, censorship also includes government regulations that
create indirect chilling effects. In his article, Orwell’s Armchair, Professor Derek E. Bambauer
defines censorship as government interdiction that prevents communication between a willing
speaker and a willing listener. See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV.
863, 871 (2012) [hereinafter Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair]. However, this definition is too
narrow. Prior restraints or prospects of subsequent punishment can also regulate citizens’
behavior. See generally, William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process:
Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982) (discussing how prior restraint and subsequent punishment
also suppress speech).
11. See infra Part I.B-D (explaining different countries’ justification for their Internet
censorship).
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national security.12 The United States, on the other hand, permits
much more content because the First Amendment provides
constitutional protections for free speech.13
Additionally, the current system of digital copyright laws
adopted by many countries, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act and E-Commerce Directive, presents potential complications
under the rights guaranteed by Article 19.14 As a consequence, the
combination of the limited text of Article 19 of the ICCPR, the range
of censorship and idiosyncratic Internet regulations and intellectual
property laws, and the divergence in transnational norms makes it
difficult to analyze the legitimacy of a specific country’s Internet
censorship policy.15
Further, countries have employed different methods of
protecting copyrights in the digital world.16 Scholars have criticized
certain national copyright laws, specifically intermediary liability and
notice-and-action systems, for their potential chilling effect on
speech.17 In response, advocacy organizations, such as the UK-based
ARTICLE 19, have recommended changes to the current paradigm of
notice-and-action systems in order to limit collateral negative
effects.18
With visions of creating a uniformly regulated Internet, some
theorists argue for an international approach to Internet regulation.19
12. See infra Part I.D (discussing the People’s Republic of China’s (“PRC’s”) Internet
censorship model).
13. See infra Part I.B (describing the US Constitution and its Internet censorship model).
14. See infra Part I.B-C (discussing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)
and E-Commerce Directive’s impact on internet speech).
15. See infra Part III (arguing that Article 19 does not effectively address the various
novel issues presented by the Internet).
16. See infra Part I.B-D (discussing various countries’ approaches to protecting digital
copyrights).
17. Governments impose intermediary liability by making communication
intermediaries, such as content providers (e.g., YouTube), legally liable for the actions of its
users. Notice-and-action is a process, generally established by a statute or court order, of
removing content after receiving certain notice. See Internet Intermediaries: Dilemma of
Liability, ARTICLE 19, http://www.article19.org/data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf
(2013) [hereinafter Internet Intermediaries] (advocating for a change to the current notice-andaction regimes); see also Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Years Under the DMCA,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 2013), https://www.eff.org/pages/unintendedconsequences-fifteen-years-under-dmca (discussing the DMCA’s effect on Internet speech).
18. See Internet Intermediaries, supra note 17 (recommending improvements on the
notice-and-action systems).
19. See, e.g., Elaine M. Chen, Global Internet Freedom: Can Censorship and Freedom
Coexist?, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 229, 232 (2003) (arguing that Internet
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Others argue that, while a global uniform censorship policy is
attractive, it is not viable.20 In an attempt to address the deficiency in
current theoretical approaches to Internet governance, Professor
Derek E. Bambauer presented a process-based metric for analyzing
Internet regulatory systems.21 The metric examines the openness,
transparency, narrowness, and accountability of a country’s
censorship scheme.22 While Professor Bambauer developed the metric
to be used in analyzing countries’ censorship systems, he did not
address its potential application to Article 19.23 This Note argues for
supplementing a similar normative metric to Article 19 of the ICCPR.
Such a metric would provide clearer guidelines for analyzing the
legitimacy of national censorship laws as measured against the
potential indirect chilling effects caused by such laws.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of Internet censorship
and international law, including the different approaches and theories
behind Internet censorship. Part I.A discusses the development of the
ICCPR and its application to the Internet. Next, Part I.B-D provides
an in-depth overview of the Internet censorship models of three
different countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and
China.
Part II examines each country’s Internet censorship model under
Article 19 of the ICCPR, considering Article 19(3)’s three-part test
and requirements established by recent UN reports interpreting them.

censorship should be left to an international arena, such as the United Nations); Nart
Villeneuve, Barriers to Cooperation: An Analysis of the Origins of International Efforts to
Protect Children Online, in ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND
RULE IN CYBERSPACE 55, 63-66 (Ronald J. Deibert et al. eds., 2010) (arguing for reciprocal
participation of governments and ISPs to remove illegal content).
20. See, e.g., Renee Keen, Untangling the Web: Exploring Internet Regulation Schemes
in Western Democracies, 13 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 351, 369-70 (arguing that an international
approach is not feasible because of the divergence of obscenity standards).
21. Professor Derek E. Bambauer is a Professor of Law at University of Arizona, James
E. Rogers College of Law. See Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377 (2009)
[hereinafter Bambauer, Cybersieves] (presenting a process-based metric of openness,
transparency, narrowness and accountability for analyzing a country’s Internet regulatory
scheme).
22. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390 (presenting the framework); see
also Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 900-06 (utilizing the framework to
analyze attempts of soft-censorship in the United States).
23. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 410-18 (arguing for various forms of
implementing the framework, but not considering the Human Rights Commission as a viable
option or the framework’s relevance to Article 19 of the ICCPR).
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The analysis will also examine each country’s copyright laws under
Article 19.
In Part III, this Note argues that due to the idiosyncrasies of each
country’s Internet censorship policy and new challenges presented by
intellectual property laws, Article 19 of the ICCPR by itself does not
provide a clear analysis of a country’s Internet policy. Article 19
should be supplemented with parts of Professor Bambauer’s
framework.24 The culturally-neutral criterion of the framework
mitigates the difficulty of analyzing and comparing countries with
different cultural norms and moral values. Moreover, the proposed
metric also allows for analysis of indirect chilling effects caused by
intellectual property laws. This Note concludes that supplementing
Article 19 with the framework proposed by Professor Bambauer is a
positive step towards creating a global standard of Internet regulation.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW AND THE INTERNET
In this Part, Section A will discuss the historical development of
the ICCPR and its subsequent application to the Internet. Next,
Section B provides an in-depth overview of the Internet censorship
models of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. These
countries were selected because each country employs a distinct
model of Internet governance.
A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
In 1948, the UN Commission on Human Rights drafted The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).25 The UDHR set
out thirty articles articulating human rights principles and established
the framework for subsequent human rights treatises, such as the
ICCPR.26 After nearly two decades of drafting, the ICCPR went into

24. See infra Part III (arguing that an Article 19 analysis should be supplemented by a
similar process-based metric).
25. See History of the Document, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUM. RTS., http://
www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing the
history of the UDHR) [hereinafter The International Declaration of Human Rights]; SCOTT
CARLSON & GREGORY GISVOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1-2 (2003) (providing the background of the UDHR).
26. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 1-2 (providing overview of the ICCPR and UDHR);
see also THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUM. RTS., supra note 25.
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effect in 1976.27 The ICCPR requires the signatory State parties to
uphold the civil and political rights of individuals, including freedom
of religion, speech, assembly, and electoral rights.28 Currently there
are over 160 State Parties, including the United States and the United
Kingdom.29 While China is a signatory of the ICCPR, it has not
ratified the treaty.30
The ICCPR contains two Optional Protocols.31 The Optional
Protocols are additional sets of rules and procedures to the ICCPR
that require separate ratification by a State Party in order to be in
effect.32 In 1976, the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR provided
an avenue for individuals who claim to have suffered a violation of an
ICCPR provision to submit complaints to the HRC, granted that the
complainant exhausted available domestic remedies.33 As of April
2014, only 115 parties to the Covenant had adopted the First Optional
Protocol.34
The Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) is the UN-designated
body responsible for writing reports about a State’s compliance with
27. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 2 (discussing the history of the ICCPR); The
Foundation of International Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (providing the history of ICCPR).
28. See ICCPR, supra note 5.
29. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV4&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated Jan. 4, 2014) (noting that there are 168 parties to the
ICCPR) [hereinafter ICCPR Parties].
30. See ICCPR Parties, supra note 29 (showing that China has not ratified the treaty);
China, CENTER FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, http://www.ccprcentre.org/country/china/
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (noting that China is not a Party to the ICCPR).
31. There are two Optional Protocols to the ICCPR. The First Optional Protocol is
relevant to this Note, and the Second Optional Protocol involves the abolition of the death
penalty. See Carlson, supra note 26, at 2 (providing an overview of the two optional protocols
to the ICCPR); Human Rights Explained: Fact Sheet 5: The International Bill of Rights,
AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (2009), https://www.humanrights.gov.au/human-rightsexplained-fact-sheet-5the-international-bill-rights (discussing the Optional Protocols)
[hereinafter ICCPR Fact Sheet 5].
32. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 2 (discussing the Optional Protocols); ICCPR Fact
Sheet 5, supra note 31 (explaining how the optional protocols supplement the ICCPR with
additional obligations to adopting State Parties).
33. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx
[hereinafter First Optional Protocol] (establishing the individual communication procedure).
34. The United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, and the United States have not
adopted the First Optional Protocol. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTIONS , https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated
Jan. 4, 2014) (listing only 115 parties to the first optional protocol).

832

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:825

the ICCPR.35 The HRC is not a UN organization per se, but rather an
independent expert committee comprised of delegates from State
Parties.36 Utilizing three procedural mechanisms—namely state
reporting, individual complaints, and inter-state complaints, the HRC
is responsible for examining a member State’s compliance with the
ICCPR obligations.37
As part of the State reporting mechanism, State Parties must
submit initial and subsequent periodic reports to inform the HRC
about measures undertaken to implement and comply with the
ICCPR.38 The HRC examines these State reports during regularly
scheduled sessions and then issues a Concluding Observation, which
includes positive observations and concerns regarding State Parties’
compliance with the ICCPR.39 The HRC also encourages compliance
with the Covenant by examining specific complaints under the First
Optional Protocol.40 If a violation is found, the HRC may suggest an
appropriate remedy.41 Similar to Concluding Observations, decisions
issued by the HRC serve as specific, authoritative interpretations of
the ICCPR.42 It is important to note that the HRC is neither a court

35. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 2-4 (explaining the role and duties of the HRC);
Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, UN HUM. RTS. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the role of the Human
Rights Committee).
36. Although they share similar names and terminology, the HRC is not the same as the
Committee on Human Rights, nor is it part of the Office of the High Commission for Human
Rights. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 2-4.
37. ICCPR, supra note 5; see Carlson, supra note 26, at 2-13 (explaining each
procedural mechanism).
38. ICCPR, supra note 5.
39. See Carlson, supra note 26 at 8-9 (discussing Concluding Observations); UN Human
Rights Committee Issues Concluding Observations on State Reports on Chad, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and the United States, INT'L JUST. RESOURCE CENTER (Apr. 3,
2014),
http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/04/03/un-human-rights-committee-issues-concludingobservations-on-state-reports-of-chad-kyrgyzstan-latvia-nepal-sierra-leone-and-the-unitedstates-of-america/ (summarizing the Concluding Observations from the 110th HRC session).
40. See First Optional Protocol, supra note 33; Carlson, supra note 25, at 9-12
(providing an overview of the First Optional Protocol).
41. See First Optional Protocol, supra note 33 (establishing the framework for State
Party member’s remedial statements to the HRC).
42. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 11 (stating that similar to the Concluding Observations
on state reports, HRC decisions offer specific, authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR);
Human Rights Treaty Bodies – Individual Communications, UN HUM. RTS., http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx
(last
visited Dec. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Individual Communications] (“The Committees’ decisions
represent an authoritative interpretation of the treaty concerned.”).
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nor does it possess the executive capacity to enforce the ICCPR.43
Rather, decisions are used to apply international pressure to a State
Party not in compliance.44
1. The Expansion of the ICCPR to the Internet
Article 19 of the ICCPR secures the right to expression and
opinion free from external repression.45 It states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities.
It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these
shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of
others; (b) For the protection of national security or of
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.46

Until recently, international human rights law concerning the
Internet was sparse.47 For instance, there is no mention of the Internet,
even in passing, in the HRC 2009–2010 report.48 Article 19 of the
43. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 11 (noting that the Committee is not a court, but it
does have interpretative authority grounded in a legally binding treaty obligation); Civil and
Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev. 1), http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014),
[hereinafter HRC Fact Sheet 15] (describing that if the HRC finds a violation in a case, the
State party is requested to remedy that violation pursuant to the obligation in Article 2,
Paragraph 3 of the ICCPR).
44. See Carlson, supra note 25, at 11 (discussing the effects of HRC decisions);
Individual Communications, supra note 42 (discussing the follow-up procedures after a
violation has been found).
45. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19.
46. Id.
47. Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 393,
396 (2013) (explaining how recent human rights reports have neglected to address the
Internet). See generally Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., Vol. 1, 97th-99th Sess., Oct. 12Oct. 30, 2009, Mar. 8-Mar. 26, 2010, July 12-July 30, 2010, U.N. Doc. A/65/40; GAOR, 65th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, (2010) [hereinafter HRC 2009-2010 Report] (failing to address any issues
regarding the Internet).
48. See HRC 2009-2010 Report, supra note 47; Land, supra note 47, at 397 (discussing
the absence of issues relating to the Internet in the 2009-2010 Human Rights Report).
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ICCPR provides no explicit protection for Internet access, a concept
that did not exist during the drafting process.49 Nonetheless, scholars
argue that the ICCPR explicitly protects expression in the “media,”
and that the drafters intended to include later-developed technologies,
such as the Internet, under Article 19.50 Scholars have looked to
recent HRC reports and publications that recognize the importance of
the Internet with respect to the right to freedom of expression.51 For
instance, in his May 2011 report, the Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expression, Frank La Rue, observed that Article 19 of the UDHR,
the precursor to the ICCPR, was drafted with the foresight to include
and accommodate future technological developments.52 Special
Rapporteur Frank La Rue wrote that, in light of the importance of the
Internet to human rights, “facilitating access to the Internet for all
individuals, with as little restrictions to online content as possible,

49. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19. The Internet was in its infancy in the late 1960s,
and it was used primarily for military purposes. Commercial use of the Internet was not
widespread until the late 1980s. See generally Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET
SOCIETY, http://www.Internetsociety.org/Internet/what-Internet/history-Internet/brief-historyInternet (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing the history of Internet development).
50. See Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 34, Art. 19: Freedoms of Opinion
and Expression, 102nd Sess., July 11-July 29, 2011, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sep. 12,
2011) (establishing that Article 19(2) protects all means of expression, including web-based
modes of expression) [hereinafter UN General Comment 34]; Land, supra note 47, at 394
(arguing that although Article 19 does not guarantee a right to the Internet, it explicitly protects
the media of expression and information)..
51. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, U.N. Doc. A/66/290 (Aug. 10, 2011) (by Frank La Rue) (declaring that access to
the Internet is essential to enjoy the rights enumerated in the ICCPR) [hereinafter August 2011
La Rue Report]; Land, supra note 47, at 398-402 (noting the recent scholarly attention
regarding the Internet and human rights); .
52. Special Rapporteur on The Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, Rep. on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27, (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter May 2011
La Rue Report] (explaining that as a result of the UDHR drafters’ foresight, “the framework of
international human rights law remains relevant today and equally applicable to new
communication technologies such as the Internet”); cf. Land, supra note 47, at 402 (utilizing a
textual approach, Professor Land interprets the term “media” to include both the form and the
channel of expression). A Special Rapporteur is an expert appointed by the HRC to examine
and report on a country’s situation on a specific area of human rights. Special Rapporteur La
Rue was the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression from August 2008 to July 2014. See Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ISSUES/FREEDOMOPINION/Pages/
OpinionIndex.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the role of the Special Rapporteur).
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should be a priority for all states.”53 In addition, his reports
condemned certain practices that “cut off access to the Internet
entirely” as “disproportionate,” thus violating Article 19 of the
ICCPR.54
Scholars argue that although a “freedom to connect” is not
specifically articulated in Article 19(2), the freedom is supported by
Article 19’s explicit protection of the rights to seek, receive, and
impart information.55 The text of Article 19(2) suggests that every
type of expression communicable is protected, subject to the
limitations in Paragraph 3 permitting censorship of speech where
necessary.56
Article 19(3) establishes that limitations on the rights
enumerated in Article 19 shall only be provided by law and must be
necessary for the respect of the rights or reputations of others, the
protection of national security, public order, public health, or
morals.57 Interpreting this provision, Special Rapporteur Frank La
Rue articulated the following test:
Any restriction on expression must be provided by law,
which must be formulated with sufficient precision to
enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct
accordingly and must be made accessible to the public
(principles of predictability and transparency);

53. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 4 (recognizing the importance of the
Internet in building democratic societies).
54. Special Rapporteur La Rue was referring to several incidents, including Egypt’s
2011 Internet blackout, the “three strikes-law” in France, and the 2010 Digital Economy Act.
See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 10-14.
55. See Land, supra note 48, at 410. Professor Land also noted that an international
“freedom to connect” is also supported by Former Secretary of State of the United States
Hillary Clinton’s January 2010 Speech. Secretary Clinton articulated that there were additional
freedoms that were inherent in the freedoms identified by former United States President
Franklin Roosevelt in his 1941 Four Freedoms speech. This “freedom to connect,” is
predicated on the idea that governments should not limit people from connecting to the
Internet or to each other. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet
Freedom, (Jan. 21, 2010), (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm) (noting that the freedom to connect is analogous to
a freedom of assembly in cyber space).
56. See Human Rights Comm., Views on Commc’ns Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/47359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev.1 (1993) (May 5, 1993) (finding that Article 19
protects any form of subjective idea or opinion capable of transmission); Carlson, supra note
25, at 121 (describing that while Article 19(2) mentions several types of media, it protects
expression in any other media).
57. See ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 19(3).
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The restriction must pursue one of the purposes set out in
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, namely (1) to protect the rights
and reputations of others, or (2) to protect national security
or of public order, or of public health or morals (principle
of legitimacy); and
The restriction must be proven necessary and the least
restrictive means required to achieve the purported aim
(principles of necessity and proportionality).58

International courts have used variations of the three-part test to
examine limitations on freedom of expression.59
2. Internet Censorship
Internet censorship schemes are commonly divided into two
groups: hard censorship and soft censorship.60 Hard censorship
involves a government exercising control over Internet infrastructure
or compelling intermediaries to do so through the force of law.61 Soft
censorship, on the other hand, involves employing laws as a pretext to
block material, paying for filtered access, or persuading
intermediaries to restrict content.62 Acts of soft censorship, such as
withholding state assistance, may be less legitimate because they are
not as visible as attempts at hard censorship, such as firewalls and
58. May 2010 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 6-7 (explaining the three-part cumulative
test); see August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 51, at 8 (requiring limitations on freedom of
expression to meet the three-part test).
59. See, e.g., Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407, ¶¶ 39-40
(1986) (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (espousing a standard similar to the three-part test); see also Agnes
Callamard, Expert Meeting on the Links Between Article 19 and 20 of the ICCPR: Freedom of
Expression and Advocacy of Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination,
Hostility or Violence, ARTICLE 19 (Oct. 2-3, 2008), http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/
conferences/iccpr-links-between-articles-19-and-20.pdf (discussing the use of the three-part
test in international courts).
60. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 867 (describing the types of
censorship); Soft Censorship, Hard Impact: A Global Review, WORLD ASS’N OF NEWSPAPERS
AND NEWS PUBLISHERS, at 4-5 (providing an overview of soft censorship).
61. Hard censorship schemes are often blocked by architectural or constitutional
constraints. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 867.
62. In Orwell’s Armchair, Professor Bambauer argues that soft censorship is less
legitimate than hard censorship because soft censorship models are not transparent, open, or
narrowly applied as hard censorship models. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10,
at 867. See also Don Podesta, Op-Ed., The Rise of Soft Censorship, WASH. POST (Feb. 2,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/01/
AR2009020101671.html (discussing an Illinois politician’s threat of withholding state
assistance from a newspaper’s parent company if the company did not fire specific members of
the editorial board who were critical of him).
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explicit censorship laws.63 For instance, after Hong Kong newspaper
publisher Next Media printed several articles opposing a proposed
security law in China, the company lost considerable advertising
revenue when the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) pressured
companies not to do business with the company.64
Filtering utilizes technological systems to prevent end-users
from receiving specific content.65 While the act of filtering is a form
of hard censorship, it can also be the result of attempts at soft
censorship.66 Internet filters have been implemented at various levels,
from the physical network infrastructure, forming the backbone of the
Internet-to-Internet service providers (“ISPs”), private networks, and
individual computers.67 During the early 1990s, there were commonly
two types of Internet filters: the inclusion filter and the exclusion
filter.68 Inclusion filters typically use “white lists” to include websites
that are permitted for browsing, whereas an exclusion filter employs a

63. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 868 (discussing why soft
censorship is often less legitimate than hard censorship); Podesta Op-Ed, supra note 62
(discussing various forms of indirect censorship).
64. Don Podesta, Soft Censorship: How the Government Around the Globe Use Money
to Manipulate the Media, CENTER FOR INT’L MEDIA ASSISTANCE (Jan. 9, 2009),
http://www.academia.edu/3651678/Soft_Censorship_How_Governments_Around_the_Globe_
Use_Money_to_Manipulate_the_Media (reporting the PRC’s use of indirect economic
pressures to chill speech); Podesta Op-Ed, supra note 62 (reporting on the PRC’s indirect
censorship).
65. An end-user is the person that uses the finished product, and is differentiated from
other types of users, such as developers, installers, and servicers. See Definition: End User,
WHATIS, (Apr. 2005), http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/end-user; What are Internet
Filters?, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/en-GB/security/resources/internetfilterswhatis.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining the role and properties of Internet filters).
66. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 889-91 (discussing United
States Congress’ use of subsidies to implement filters in US public schools and libraries); also
Internet Filtering as a Form of Soft Censorship, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 19, 2010), http://
www.computerworld.com/article/2468012/endpoint-security/internet-filtering-as-a-form-ofsoft-censorship.html (discussing the effects of the Children’s Internet Protection Act).
67. See Marc D. Nawyn, Code Red: Responding to the Moral Hazards Facing U.S.
Information Technology Companies in China, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 505, 511
(describing the implementation of Internet filtering in a variety of access points); About
Filtering, OPENNET INITIATIVE, https://opennet.net/about-filtering (last visited Apr. 5, 2015)
(overview of Internet filtering).
68. See Nawyn, supra note 67, at 510 (describing inclusion and exclusion filters); see
also Marjorie Heins & Christina Cho, Internet Filters: A Public Policy Report, Free
Expression Policy Project, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST CENSORSHIP (2001), available at
http://ncac.org/wp-content/uploads/import/Internet%20Filter.pdf (describing early Internet
Filters).
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“blacklist” which specifies websites that users are prohibited from
visiting.69
Currently, Internet filtering technology has progressed towards
using “content analysis” in place of whitelists and blacklists.70 Filters
utilizing content analysis prevents users from accessing any site
containing specified keywords, phrases, or even images.71 This
provides two key advantages to censors over the traditional exclusion
and inclusion filters.72 First, unlike traditional filters, content analysis
filters do not need to be regularly updated with URL lists.73 Secondly,
content analysis filters maintain greater accuracy than filters that
block sites at the IP address level.74 As a result of its targeted
blocking, content analysis filters allow users to receive data from sites
that would otherwise be blocked altogether by traditional filters.75
Content analysis filters have been compared to “censoring out
individual sentences within books, as opposed to censoring entire
books themselves.”76
B. Internet Censorship: The United States
1. The Onset of Internet Censorship in the United States
Over the course of US history, the First Amendment of the US
Constitution has developed into a bulwark against government
69. See Ronald J. Deibert & Nart Villeneuve, Firewalls and Power: An Overview of
Global State Censorship of the Internet, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 112, 112
(Andrew Murray & Mathias Klang eds., 2004) (describing exclusion and inclusion filters);
Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511-12 (explaining the difference between white and black lists).
70. See Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511 (discussing the trend towards content analysis
filters); see also Jyh-An Lee & Ching-Yi Liu, Forbidden City Enclosed by the Great Firewall:
The Law and Power of the Internet Filtering in China, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI & TECH. 125, 131
(2012) (describing China’s adoption of content-analysis filters).
71. See Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511 (explaining how content analysis filters operate);
Deibert, supra note 70, at 112 (describing the capabilities of content analysis filters).
72. See, e.g., Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511 (explaining the advantages of content
analysis filters over exclusion and inclusion filters); Real-time Content Analysis, BLOXX, http:/
/www.bloxx.com/product-technical-info/1/real_time-content-analysis (last visited Apr. 5,
2015) (comparing the key differences of their content analysis filters and traditional exclusion
filters).
73. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (comparing the differences between
content analysis filters and traditional filters).
74. See, e.g., Deibert, supra note 69, at 113 (discussing the advantages of content
analysis filters); Nawyn, supra note 68, at 511-13 (describing the benefits of content analysis
filtering).
75. See Deibert, supra note 70 at 113; Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511-13.
76. See Deibert, supra note 70 at 113; Nawyn, supra note 67, at 511-13.
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attempts at censorship.77 Despite the First Amendment and the
decentralized nature of the Internet, in 1996, the US Congress made
its first attempt to regulate Internet content with the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”).78 Section 223(d) (1) criminalized the use
interactive computer services to knowingly transmit “patently
offensive” communications to children under the age of eighteen.79 In
American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, the American Civil Liberties
Union (“ACLU”) sought a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the CDA in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, arguing, inter alia, that the CDA was
unconstitutionally vague and failed to define “indecent” and “patently
offensive.”80 The District Court ultimately found that the CDA’s
effect on the protected speech of adults was “too intrusive to be
outweighed by the government's asserted interest . . . in protecting
minors from access to indecent material.”81 Consequently, the District
Court held that the CDA was facially unconstitutional.82
Agreeing with the District Court’s findings, the Supreme Court
struck down § 223 of the CDA.83 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, explained that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, and
that the ambiguous language rendered the CDA inconsistent with the
purposes of the First Amendment.84 Justice Stevens further noted that
the lack of definitions for both “patently offensive” and “indecent”
creates ambiguity about the relationship between the two standards.85
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Reno, Congress
passed the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”) in 1998.86 COPA
77. Modern First Amendment jurisprudence has greatly expanded what was traditionally
regarded as “speech.” See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, regarded the First Amendment as a “vast and privileged
sphere.” Id.; see also Blake Covington Norvell, The Modern First Amendment and Copyright
Law, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 547, 549-52 (2009) (arguing that the modern First
Amendment doctrine is more than a doctrine against prior restraints)
78. Communication Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996), invalidated by Reno
v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) [hereinafter CDA].
79. CDA § 223(d)(1)(A). See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(providing an overview of the statutory provisions at issue) aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
80. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 826-28.
81. Id. at 855.
82. Id. at 883.
83. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875.
84. Id. at 870.
85. Id. at 871.
86. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (1998), invalidated by Am. Civil
Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008) [hereinafter COPA].
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revised the CDA’s prior proscription of transmitting indecent
communciations to individuals under the age of eighteen to
prohibiting such communications toindividuals under the age of
seventeen.87 The scope of COPA was narrowed in its application to
the “World Wide Web” and commercial sites.88 Furthermore, the
revised statute prohibits material that is “harmful to minors” rather
than “indecent material.”89 Both the CDA and COPA provided an
affirmative defense to Internet publishers that implemented access
restrictions through age verification and credit card requirements.90
Presently, COPA has been effectively disabled after a rally of
legal battles.91 In 1998, similar to the CDA, the ACLU challenged
COPA the day President Clinton signed it into law.92 The Eastern
District of Pennsylvania subsequently granted an initial preliminary
87. Compare COPA § 231(e)(7) (defining “minor” as any person under 17 years of age),
with CDA § 223 (prohibiting transmissions of indcent communcaitions to individuals under 18
years of age).
88. Compare COPA § 231 (a)(1) (“[B]y means of the World Wide Web”), with CDA
§ 223(h)(1)(C) (“[T]ransmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet”). The World Wide Web
should not be conflated with the Internet. The World Wide Web is a separate platform that
utilizes the Internet to transmit data. See Keith Wagstaff, The Internet and the World Wide
Web Are Not the Same Thing, NBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/
Internet/Internet-world-wide-web-are-not-same-thing-n51011 (describing the difference
between the World Wide Web and the Internet).
Compare COPA § 231(e)(2)(A)-(B) (limiting the scope to commercial websites), with
CDA § 223 (prohibiting all transfer of the obscene and offensive content to minors).
89. CDA § 223 encountered fatal scrutiny in Reno because, among other things,
“indecent” was not defined. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871. COPA, on the other hand, utilizes the
Miller test to determine whether the content is obscene. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 570
(2002). The expression is obscene if:
(1) . . . the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, that the material is
designed to appeal to the prurient interests; (2) it depicts, describes or represents, in
a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act
or sexual contact, an actual or simulated or perverted sexual act, or a lewd
exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breasts; and (3) taken as a whole
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for minors.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (establishing the Miller or “Three-Prong Obscenity”
Test).
90. CDA. § 223(e); COPA U.S.C. § 231(c)-(d).
91. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural history of
the “COPA cases”).
92. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) aff'd, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir.
2000), vacated sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (enjoining the enforcement
of COPA after President Clinton signed it into law on Oct. 21, 1998); The Legal Challenge to
the Child Online Protection Act, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/
free_speech/copa/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the procedural history of ACLU v.
Reno).
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injunction against government enforcement of COPA.93 After several
appeals and a remand, in 2009 the Supreme Court of the United States
finally refused to grant the government’s petition for writ of
certiorari, which conclusively disabled COPA.94
In another attempt to protect children from inappropriate content
on the Internet, the US Congress passed the Children’s Internet
Protection Act (“CIPA”) in 2000.95 Departing from CDA and
COPA’s punitive approach, CIPA conditioned a school or library’s
receipt of certain federal funding on the implementation of protective
measures, namely Internet filters.96 The protective measures were
required to restrict access to material containing visual depictions of
child pornography or material that is obscene or harmful to minors.97
CIPA also allows authorized library personnel to disable the filtering
software for “bona fide research or other lawful purposes.”98 In 2003,
the Supreme Court held that CIPA, at least facially, did not violate the
First Amendment.99 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the filtering policy
did not burden constitutionally protected speech if an adult could
simply ask a librarian to disable the filter without delay.100

93. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 499.
94. See Mukasey v. ACLU, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009) (mem.); Scott Nicholas, COPA
Child-Porn Law Killed, PCWORLD (Jan. 22, 2009, 8:00 AM) http://www.pcworld.com/
article/158131/copa_killed.html (reporting the end of COPA).
95. The CIPA affects two federal grant statutes. Children's Internet Protection Act of
2001, (CIPA) Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 1701-1741, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified at 20
U.S.C.A. § 9134 (2010) and 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(h) (2008)). The Library Services and
Technology Act (“LSTA”) authorizes grants to state library administrative agencies to, inter
alia, assist libraries in accessing information through the Internet and to pay costs for libraries
to acquire and share computer systems and telecommunication technology. See Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriation Act of 1997. Pub. L. No. 104–208 Title II, § 212, 110 Stat. 3009295 (1996)_(codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 9121 (2010))
The E-Rate program established by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides
qualifying libraries a discount to Internet access. See Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pub.
L. No. 104-104, § 254, 110 Stat. 71 (1996) (codified in 47 U.S.C.A § 254(h)(1)(b) (2008));
Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 15 (2004)
(providing an overview of CIPA).
96. 20 U.S.C.A § 9134(f)(A) (2010); 47 U.S.C.A § 254(h)(6)(B)(i) (2008). Congress
became concerned that federal funds were being used to facilitate access to pornography. See
S. REP. NO. 106–41, at 2 (1998) (“[Pornography] may be accessed directly and intentionally,
or may turn up as the unintended product of a general Internet search.”).
97. 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(1)(A) (2010); 47 U.S.C.A § 254(h)(6)(B)(i) (2008)
98. 20 U.S.C.A § 9134(f)(3) (2010); 47 U.S.C.A § 254(h)(6)(D) (2008)
99. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
100. See id. at 214.
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In the United States, telecommunication companies own and
operate a significant majority of the Internet’s infrastructure.101
Nonetheless, various US agencies regulate the Internet in some
capacity. For instance, the Department of Homeland Security protects
the integrity of the infrastructure from natural disasters and cyberattacks.102 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) monitors online
advertising and tracking.103 In 2010, the Federal Communication
Commission (“FCC”) released an “Open Internet” Order mandating
that ISPs not block lawful content and services, subject to reasonable
network management, and requiring ISPs to not unreasonably
discriminate against transmission of lawful traffic.104 However, on
January 14, 2014, the US Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia struck down the core non-discriminatory provision of the
2010 Order.105
2. US Copyright Laws and Their Chilling Effects
Scholars have argued that copyright laws inherently affect
freedom of speech.106 However, copyright laws are permitted even in
101. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE:
CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING A PUBLIC/PRIVATE RECOVERY (October 23, 2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/118189.pdf (discussing that vast majority of its infrastructure is
currently owned and operated by the private sector).
102. See id. (reporting DHS’ plans in coordinating with private industry infrastructure
stakeholders to produce various Internet recovery-related plans). See generally Court Rules
Dept. of Homeland Security Must Reveal ‘Internet Kill Switch’ Protocol, RT, (Nov. 17, 2013,
2:19 AM) http://rt.com/usa/homeland-security-Internet-kill-switch-742/ (reporting the District
Court’s decision to require DHS to reveal its rumored capabilities to shut down the Internet
during national crises).
103. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Staff Revises Online Behavioral Advertising
Principles, (Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/
02/ftc-staff-revises-online-behavioral-advertising-principles (reporting the FTC’s recent
revision to balance the potential benefits of behavioral advertising against the privacy
concerns).
104. Many dubbed the FCC Order as the net-neutrality order because it prevented
discrimination based on content. See Open Internet, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/openInternet
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (discussing the principle of net-neutrality).
105. While the Court of Appeals upheld the transparency requirement of the FCC order,
the court struck down the anti-blocking and nondiscrimination provisions to broadband
providers. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
106. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech:
Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 83 (2002)
(providing a general overview of the copyright law vis-à-vis the First Amendment); David S.
Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1393,
1395 (2009) (discussing the inherent tension between the First Amendment's community right
to hear and copyright law).
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societies that value the free exchange of expression because copyright
laws are seen overall as enhancing expression by incentivizing new
creations and publications.107 On March 1, 1989, the United States
became a party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (the “Berne Convention”), an international
agreement governing copyrights.108 In efforts to expand the scope of
the Berne Convention, a 100-year-old copyright agreement, to the
digital era, members of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”) adopted the World Intellectual Property Organization
Copyright Treaty (“WIPO Treaty”) in 1996.109 The WIPO Treaty
requires members to, among other things, establish adequate legal
protection against the circumvention of technological protections used
by authors in protecting their works.110 However, US implementation
of the WIPO Treaty resulted in unforeseen chilling effects on Internet
speech.111
In 1998, the US Congress enacted the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) in accordance with the WIPO treaty.112
Specifically, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation

107. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (recognizing that copyright laws
spur the creation and publication of new expressions); Chemerinsky, supra note 108, at 83
(discussing how copyright law may be consistent with the First Amendment when it exists to
encourage the creation and distribution of more speech).
108. The United States became a party to the Berne Convention through the adoption of
The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The Berne
Convention was first accepted in Berne, Switzerland, in 1886. See Binyomin Kaplan,
Determining Ownership of Foreign Copyright: A Three-Tier Proposal, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
2045, 2050 n.20 (2000) (noting that Berne Convention was originally signed by ten nations in
1886).
109. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Treaty]; see WIPO
Treaties - General Information, WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/general/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing the history of the WIPO).
110. See WIPO Treaty, supra note 109, at art. 11 (requiring members to provide legal
protections and remedies against the circumvention of technological measures); Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing that the DMCA was
enacted in compliance with the WIPO treaty).
111. See Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Years under the DMCA, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (March 2013), https://www.eff.org/pages/unintended-consequences-fifteenyears-under-dmca (discussing the DMCA’s effect on Internet speech); infra notes 275-92
(describing the DMCA’s chilling effect).
112. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, at 1 (1998) (discussing the implementation of the
WIPO treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty); David L. Hitchcock & Kathy E.
Needleman, Current Status of Copyright Protection in the Digital Age and Related Topics, 8
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 539, 550-54 (2002) (providing a brief overview of the DMCA).
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Act (“OCILLA”) codified Title II of the DMCA.113 Title II,
commonly referred to as “§ 512,” protects service providers by
establishing a “safe harbor,” which limits the service’s intermediary
liability for the copyright infringement of its users provided that the
service provider implements copyright policies and a notice-andtakedown system.114 Upon receiving notice, a service provider must
promptly remove or block access to the material in order to qualify
for the § 512 safe harbor.115
Generally, the DMCA’s system of counter-notification forces the
online poster to reassert the lawfulness of his speech.116 For example,
if a subscriber provides a proper “counter-notice” claiming that the
material does not infringe a copyright, the service provider must then
promptly notify the claiming party of the individual's objection.117 By
providing a “counter-notice,” however, the counter-notifier must
submit, among other things, her name and address to the service
provider.118 This presents a problem for Internet users who want to
remain anonymous. For instance, suspected terrorist organizations
have used DMCA takedowns of YouTube videos critical of Islam in
efforts to obtain the uploader’s address and name.119
113. See 17 U.S.C.A, § 512 (2010); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19,
26-28 (2012) (providing factual background of the DMCA Safe Harbor); see also S. Rep. No.
105-190, at 2 (1998) (addressing the need of a safe harbor provision).
114. See ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET
FILTERING 231 (Jonathan Zittrain et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the nature of § 512 safe harbor
provision). § 512 was intended to balance the need for swift, methodic response to potential
infringement with the rights of the content-poster. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 18 (1998)
(discussing concerns regarding the application of § 512).
115. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1) (2010); Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient
Process or "Chilling Effects"? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 625-26 (2006)
(describing the 512 takedown mechanism).
116. See Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's Safe Harbor: Chilling
Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 177 (2010)
(explaining that the added cost operates as censorship). But see Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra
note 21, at 401 (recognizing that there is value in the DMCA’s citizen-participatory process).
117. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(2)(B)-(C) (2010); see Question: What are the Counter-Notice
and Put-Back Procedures?, CHILLING EFFECTS, http://www.chillingeffects.org/question.cgi?
QuestionID=132 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing § 512 counter-notice and put-back
procedures).
118. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(3)(D) (2010).
119. See Stephen Doble, Youtubers Targeted by Terrorists After Copyright Claim,
VIDEOTER (Nov. 6, 2014), http://videoter.com/youtubers-targeted-by-terrorists-after-dmcaclaim/ (reporting the suspected use of DMCA takedowns by terrorist organizations); Paul
Tamburro, Terrorists Hunt Down Youtuber Using Information From Fake DMCA Claim,
CRAVEONLINE (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.craveonline.com/lifestyle/tech-and-gadgets-news/
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3. SOPA and PIPA: The Menacing Twins
Recently, Congress encountered the ire of Internet users, tech
companies, and scholars with the proposal of the Stop Online Privacy
Act (“SOPA”) and its Senate counterpart, Protect Internet Property
Act (“PIPA”).120 SOPA was directed towards websites that are
“dedicated to the theft of US property.”121 Under section 102(a), a
foreign website is deemed to be a “foreign infringing site” if:
(1) the Internet site or portion thereof is a U.S.-directed site
and is used by users in the United States;
(2) the owner or operator of such Internet site is committing
or facilitating the commission of criminal violations
punishable under . . . Title 18, United States Code; and
(3) the Internet site would, by reason of acts described in
paragraph (1), be subject to seizure in the United States in
an action brought by the Attorney General if such site were
a domestic Internet site.122

In practice, a foreign website hosting user-generated content
may be deemed an “infringing site” under § 102 simply because of
the allegedly infringing acts of a single user.123
SOPA has the potential to fundamentally change the current
DMCA notice-and-takedown regime without providing adequate due
process.124 The language in § 102 and § 103 of the bill grants
complainants or the Attorney General the ability to stop online
advertisers and credit card processors from doing business with the

785199-terrorists-hunt-youtuber-using-information-fake-dmca-claim
(reporting
that
a
Youtuber is hiding from suspected terrorists after sharing his information pursuant to the
DMCA counter-notification procedures).
120. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. Bill 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. Bill
968, 112th Cong. (2011).
121. H.R. 3261 § 103; see Jan André BlackBurn-Cabera, Streaming Movies Online: The
E! True Hollywood Story 5 U. PUERTO RICO BUS. L.J. 59, 86 (2014).
122. H.R. 3261 § 102(a).
123. Note H.R. 3261 § 102(a)’s lack of any intent or knowledge requirement. See id. A
foreign website can be deemed an infringing site without inducement or knowledge of the
criminal infringement by site’s operator. See id; see also Luke Johnson, What is SOPA? AntiPiracy Bill Explained, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2012), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/19/what-is-sopa_n_1216725.html#s620431title=
Rep_Keith_Ellison (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (reporting the effects of SOPA).
124. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (explaining SOPA’s notice
procedure).
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targeted website, by the mere act of filing a unilateral complaint.125
For example, if PayPal receives notice from a complainant, PayPal
has five days to disable its financial services with the alleged website
in order to be protected under the law.126
A host of critics have argued that SOPA would negatively
impact US cybersecurity and violate the First Amendment.127 The
Electronic Freedom Foundation, an international organization that
deals with legal issues in the digital world, argues that SOPA
essentially allows the Attorney General to blacklist companies from
doing business using the web.128 Constitutional scholar Laurence H.
Tribe argues that the notice-and-termination procedure of § 103(a) is
inconsistent with “prior restraint” doctrine.129 In US First Amendment
jurisprudence, prior restraint occurs when restrictions are placed on
expression before the expression occurs.130 Section 103(a) delegates
to a private party the power to suppress speech without prior notice
and a judicial hearing.131
125. H.R. Bill 3261 §§ 102(c), 103(b); see BlackBurn-Cabera, supra note 122, at 86
(explaining that SOPA would have allow the removal of copyright infringing content from
websites without providing adequate procedures for websites to defend themselves).
126. See H.R. 3261 § 103(b).
127. See Growing Chorus of Opposition to "Stop Online Piracy Act", CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.cdt.org/report/growing-chorusopposition-stop-online-piracy-act (listing concerns and complaints of a growing chorus of
opposition to SOPA); Tim Hornyak, Blare Your Dissent with Anti-SOPA Ringtones, CNET
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.cnet.com/news/blare-your-dissent-with-anti-sopa-ringtone/
(reporting one way to protest against SOPA and PIPA).
128. Trevor Timm, The Stop Online Piracy Act: A Blacklist by Any Other Name is Still A
Blacklist, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 7, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2011/11/stop-online-piracy-act-blacklist-any-other-name-still-blacklist (discussing how the bill
gives the Attorney General the power to essentially blacklist companies from doing business
on the Internet); see Parker Higgins, What's On the Blacklist? Three Sites That SOPA Could
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Nov.
15,
2012),
Put
at
Risk,
ELECTRONIC
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/whats-blacklist-three-sites-sopa-could-put-risk
(discussing three sites that may be negatively affected by SOPA).
129. Laurence H. Tribe is a Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School. See
Lawerence H. Tribe, The “Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA) Violates The First Amendment,
SERENDIPITY (last visited Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.serendipity.li/cda/tribe-legis-memo-onSOPA-12-6-11-1.pdf (arguing that SOPA violates the First Amendment because the language
of the bill is impermissibly vague and amounts to prior restraint).
130. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (invalidating a
Rhode Island law that created an extrajudicial committee based on the prior restraint doctrine);
see Robert Plotkin, Fighting Keywords: Translating the First Amendment to Protect Software
Speech, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 329, 389 (Fall 2003) (describing the use of prior
restraint doctrine in respect to circumvention software).
131. See H.R. 3261 § 102(a); Tribe, supra note 129 (arguing that section 102 amounts to
a form of extrajudicial prior restraint).
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Similar to its twin bill in the US House of Representatives,
SOPA, PIPA authorizes a private right of action for copyright holders
against alleged infringing websites.132 However, unlike SOPA, PIPA
limits its target to websites with “no significant use other than
engaging in, enabling, or facilitating the reproduction, distribution, or
public performance of copyrighted works . . . .”133
On November 15, 2011, several tech giants placed a full-page
advertisement in the New York Times telling members of Congress
that they do not support the language of the bills.134 On January 18,
2012, English Wikipedia, Reddit, Google, and others temporarily shut
down or altered their websites in order to protest SOPA and PIPA.135
Facing large opposition from the Internet and tech community, US
House of Representative Lamar Smith stated that “[t]he House
Judiciary Committee [would] postpone consideration of the
legislation until there is a wider agreement on a solution.”136
In sum, the US legislation-based model is largely influenced by
concerns of protecting property rights and minors from obscenity.137
132. S. Bill 968, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
133. See Mike Masnick, Full Text Of The PROTECT IP Act Released: The Good, The
Bad And The Horribly Ugly, TECHDIRT (May 11, 2011), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20110511/00115314234/full-text-protect-ipact-released-good-bad-horribly-ugly.shtml
(discussing pros and cons of PIPA). Compare H.R. 3261 § 102 (broadly defining a foreign
infringing websites), with S. Bill 968 § 2 (defining “Internet site dedicated to infringing
activities” as a website with “no significant use other than engaging in, enabling, or facilitating
the reproduction, distribution, or public performance of copyrighted works . . . .”).,
134. See Andrew Couts, Internet Titans Fight SOPA With Full-Page NY Times Ad,
DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.digitaltrends.com/web/internet-titans-fightsopa-with-full-page-ny-times-ad/; Cory Doctorow, Internet Giants Place Full-Page AntiSOPA Ad in NYT, BOINGBOING (Nov. 16, 2011), http://boingboing.net/2011/11/16/Internetgiants-place-full-pag.html.
135. See Tom Cheredar, SOPA Blackouts and Protests Go Live (Gallery of Screenshots),
VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 17, 2012), http://venturebeat.com/2012/01/17/sopa-protests-go-live
(reporting that Google updated its homepage with a large sideways black box over the
company’s logo); SOPA Protests Planned by Google, Wikipedia and Others on Jan. 18,
WASH. POST, (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sopaprotests-planned-by-google-wikipedia-and-others-on-jan-18/2012/01/17/
gIQALKBL6P_story.html (reporting the companies’ objection to language in the bills that
grant the United States Government the right to block entire Web sites with copyrightinfringing content).
136. Johnathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/
technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.html?_r=0 (reporting that congressional leaders
shelved PIPA and SOPA after facing vehement opposition).
137. See supra notes 78-136 and accompanying text (describing the various legislations
that regulate Internet content).
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In addition, compared to other countries, the US model relies on a
system of removal through private action rather than blacklisting or
blocking.138 Despite numerous legislative attempts to regulate speech
on the Internet, the United States still maintains one of the world’s
most robust protections for freedom of speech.139 The core value of
freedom of expression is further evident in community protests
against bills such as SOPA and PIPA.140 Despite the United States’
constitutional protections of speech, the chilling effects caused by the
country’s copyright laws run afoul of the spirit of Article 19.141
C. United Kingdom: Watchdogs and the End of Cyber-Libertarianism
Compared to the United States, the United Kingdom has a
hands-off approach to regulating Internet content.142 The UK model
of Internet governance involves, among other things, citizenparticipation and cooperation between private and government
agencies.143

138. See supra notes 106-119 and accompanying text (discussing the DMCA’s noticeand-takedown procedure); see also Zittrain, supra note 114, at 226 (describing that US content
restriction relies more on the removal of content rather than blocking).
139. See, e.g., Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self-Government: The Enforcement
of Foreign Libel Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1978, 1979 (1994) (comparing
the speech-protective standard employed by the United States to countries such as Britain and
Canada, which have libel laws that favor plaintiffs' interest in privacy and reputation at the
expense of freedom of the press); Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free
Speech at-and Beyond-Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1585 (2010) (discussing
that plaintiffs have obtained judgments against US authors under foreign libel laws that are
less speech protective than US laws).
140. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing the community protests
against SOPA and PIPA).
141. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 11-12 (arguing that the current
system of notice-and-takedown systems, such as the DMCA, is subject to abuse by State and
private actors); Internet Intermediaries, supra note 18, at 10 (discussing comments by
international bodies on intermediary liability regimes).
142. See Open Net Initiative: United Kingdom, OPEN NET INITIATIVE, 357 (Dec. 18
2010), available at https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_UnitedKingdom_2010.pdf
(noting that the UK’s “no-table libertarian tradition” is manifested by its solid guarantees of
freedom of expression, freedom of information, and protection of privacy) [hereinafter ONI
UK Report]. See generally, Keen, supra note 20, at 368 (discussing that the United Kingdom’s
approach to the regulation of Internet content involves allowing Internet users to regulate their
own Internet experience by offering tools to assist citizens in controlling the content that they
want to see).
143. See Keen, supra note 20, at 368; infra notes 150-160 and accompanying text
(discussing the UK government’s cooperation with the Internet Watch Foundation).
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As a member of the European Union, the UK has implemented
the bloc’s directives into law.144 For instance, the UK incorporated
provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”)
into the UK Human Rights Act of 1998.145 Similar to Article 19 of the
ICCPR, Article 10 of the EHCR contains a right to the freedom of
expression and allows restrictions that are “in accordance with law”
and “necessary in a democratic society.”146
1. The Internet Watch Foundation
In 1996, the UK Metropolitan Police reported that child
pornography was surfacing on newsgroups, a type of forum with
discussion of a particular topic.147 The Department of Trade &
Industry, led discussions with Internet Service Provider Association
(“ISPA”), Home Office, Metropolitan Police, and Safety-Net
Foundation, concerning the proliferation of illegal content on the
newsgroups.148 The result of the discussions was the creation of the
R3 Safety Net Agreement, which in turn formed the Internet Watch
Foundation (“IWF”).149
The IWF is an independent non-government organization, which
receives support from the UK government.150 The IWF is tasked with
144. See ONI UK Report, supra note 142, at 357 (noting that EU’s law takes precedence over
national law); Q&A: How UK Adopts EU Laws, BBC (Jul. 21, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/8160808.stm (explaining how the United Kingdom adopts EU legislation).
145. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42. (U.K.).
146. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
147. See IWF History, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/about-iwf/
iwf-history (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (discussing the history of IWF) [hereinafter IWF
History].
148. The Department of Trade and Industry, a former UK government agency
responsible for trade, science, and innovation, has been replaced by agencies, such as the
Department of Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform. ISPA is a trade organization
comprised of UK Internet Service Providers. The Home Office is a UK government
department that oversees immigration, security and drug matters. See Keen supra note 16, at
366 (explaining the history of the IWF); IWF History, supra note 148 (describing the multistakeholder discussion regarding child pornography on the Internet).
149. The R3 refers to rating, reporting, and responsibility. See IWF History, supra note
148 (discussing the eventual formation of the IWF).
150. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”)
and the Association of Chief Police Officers (“ACPO”) Concerning Section 46 Sexual
Offences Act 2003, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (Oct. 6, 2004), https://www.cps.gov.uk/
publications/docs/mousexoffences.pdf [hereinafter CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE] (noting
the police and CPS’ support and partnership with the Internet Watch Foundation in
establishing hotlines for individuals to report potentially illegal content); Vision and Mission,
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combating illegal content on the Internet, specifically child
pornography and criminally obscene adult content.151 The IWF does
not initiate its own independent investigations, but rather operates
hotlines where members of the public can report child pornography
and other illegal content.152 Once a report is filed, the IWF reviews
the legality of the material.153 Upon a determination that the content
violates UK law, the IWF attempts to determine the origin of the
material and reports the content to the UK police or an appropriate
overseas law enforcement agency.154 In the United Kingdom, Internet
content is regulated pursuant to “offline” regulations.155 For instance,
the IWF reviews reported materials in accordance with laws such as
the Sexual Offense Act of 2003—which criminalizes sex crimes, such
as rape—and The Protection of Children Act of 1978—which
criminalizes the creation and possession child pornography.156
With respect to Internet filtering, the IWF’s role is limited to
compiling a blacklist, labeled the “URL list,” from their reports and
notifying UK ISPs of illegal content.157 The list of blocked websites is
not made public, however, the IWF maintains that every URL on its
INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/about-iwf/remit-vision-and-mission (last
visited Dec. 30, 2014) (“Our vision is the elimination of child sexual abuse images online”)
[hereinafter IWF Mission] .
151. See IWF Mission, supra note 150 (discussing the organization’s goal and mission to
fight child pornography on the Internet).
152. See Keen, supra note 21, at 366 (describing the IWF reporting process); see also
Report Process, INTERNET WATCH FOUNDATION, https://www.iwf.org.uk/hotline/reportprocess (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining the IWF’s reporting process) [hereinafter IWF
Reporting Process].
153. See CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, supra note 151 at 6 (discussing the IWF’s
role);IWF Reporting Process, supra note 153 (describing the IWF’s reporting process).
154. See URL List, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/members/
member-policies/url-list (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining that the IWF’s also notifies
their partner organizations in other countries of non-UK sites containing pornography)
[hereinafter IWF URL List].
155. See Keen, supra note 21, at 368-69 (noting that offline laws govern what is suitable
on the Internet); see also Internet Censorship: Law & Policy Around the World, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIERS AUSTRALIA, https://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens3.html#uk (last visited
Dec. 30, 2014) (noting that as of the time the report was written, the United Kingdom has not
enacted censorship legislation specific to the Internet).
156. See Sexual Offence Act, 2003, c. 42, sch. 6 (U.K.) The Protection of Children Act,
1978 c. 37 (U.K.); Keen, supra note 21, at 366 (discussing that IWF reviews material pursuant
to UK “offline” laws); Laws Relating to the IWF's Remit, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://
www.iwf.org.uk/hotline/the-laws (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (listing the pertinent laws that
IWF uses to assess reported material).
157. See IWF URL List, supra note 154 (discussing the URL list); Keen, supra note 78,
at 367 (explaining the IWF’s blacklist); Open Net Initiate, supra note 144, at 360 (discussing
the IWF’s role of compiling a blacklist of websites).
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list depicts indecent images of children or advertisements to illegal
content.158 Aside from informal pressures, currently there is no EU or
UK law that requires ISPs to utilize filters.159 The actual act of
blocking results from an ISP’s decision to utilize the URL list.160
In 2003, The British Telecom (“BT”), one of the largest UK
ISPs, designed a new Internet filtering system, dubbed
“CleanFeed.”161 CleanFeed is designed to prevent their customers
from accessing any illegal content listed on the URL list.162 While the
exact design of BT’s CleanFeed has not been published, research has
extrapolated the suspected design based.163 CleanFeed purportedly
utilizes a two-tiered hybrid design of traffic redirection and web
proxies intended to be extremely precise while maintaining low
operation costs and management.164
2. Prime Minister’s Proposal: Default Filtering for Everyone
In July 2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron began
advocating for the default filtering of pornography, prefacing that

158. See IWF URL List Recipients, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/
members/member-policies/url-list/iwf-list-recipients (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (noting to
whom the organization gives their URL list); see also Lillian Edwards, ‘From Child Porn to
China, in One CleanFeed,’ 3(3) SCRIPT-ED, 174 (2006), available at http://
www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-3/editorial.pdf (noting that the IWF does not release its
URL list).
159. See ONI UK Report, supra note 142, at 359 (“This is consistent with broader EU
law which states that ISPs acting as ‘mere conduits’ of information are not liable for any
illegal information transmitted.”); Keen, supra note 21, at 367 (noting that aside from informal
pressures, ISPs are not required to utilize the URL list).
160. See IWF URL List, supra note 154 (noting that since 2004 many ISPs have chosen
to utilize the URL list); see also Keen, supra note 21, at 367 (“[T]the blocking solution is
entirely a matter for the company deploying the list.”).
161. See Open Net Initiative: United Kingdom, supra note 144, at 360 (discussing the
filtering system, CleanFeed). See generally Richard Clayton, Failures in a Hybrid Content
Blocking System, https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/cleanfeed.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014)
(discussing the flaws of the CleanFeed system).
162. See Clayton, supra note 161, at 1-2 (explaining the system’s design); see also Open
Net Initiative: United Kingdom, supra note 144, at 283 (explaining that BT blocks Web sites
that are flagged by IWF).
163. See Clayton, supra note 162, at 4 (prefacing his report that BT has not disclosed the
design of CleanFeed).
164. See Clayton, supra note 162, at 4 (describing CleanFeed’s two-tier design); Richard
Clayton, Anonymity and Traceability in Cyberspace, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. COMPUTER
LABORATORY, TECH. REP. NO. 653, 120-22 (November 2005), available at http://
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-653.pdf (describing that system’s advantages).

852

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:825

online pornography is “corroding childhood.”165 The proposed
measure will involve preliminary contact from the ISP, asking
whether the family would like to activate “family friendly filters” to
restrict adult material.166 Customers who do not select an option will
have the filters activated by default.167 The proposed measures will
also affect the UK’s Internet access at the infrastructure level.168 UK
ISPs have rewired their infrastructure, affecting all devices connected
to a subscriber’s home Internet account.169 The Open Rights Group,
an organization defending Internet freedom, spoke with several UK
ISPs and discovered that users will also be required to opt-in for any
content tagged as violent, extremist, terrorist, anorexia and eating
disorders, suicide, alcohol, smoking, Web forums, esoteric material,
and Web-blocking circumvention tools.170

165. Oliver Wright, David Cameron Cracks Down on Online Pornography With 'Porn
Block' Option, THE INDEP. (July 22, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/
david-cameron-cracks-down-on-online-pornography-with-porn-block-option-8725803.html
(reporting that every UK home will have pornography blocked by their Internet provider
unless the householder choose to receive it); see Ryan Neal, War On Porn In The UK: Does
David Cameron's Plan To Battle Child Pornography Go Too Far?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July
22,
2013),
http://www.ibtimes.com/war-porn-uk-does-david-camerons-plan-battle-childpornography-go-too-far-video-1355279 (“By the end of the year, anyone in the UK creating a
new broadband account or switching ISPs will have to actively disable filters to access porn.”).
166. See David Cameron, The Internet and Pornography: Prime Minister Calls for
Action, (July 22, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-Internetand-pornography-prime-minister-calls-for-action (describing the onset of the proposed
measure); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the UK Prime Minister’s
plan).
167. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (describing the process of
implementing the new filters).
168. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (describing the effect of the new
filters).
169. See Cameron, supra note 166 (discussing that the ISPs have rewired their
technology so that once filters are installed they will cover any device connected to home
Internet account); Josh Taylor, UK to Automatically filter ‘Adult’ Internet Content, ZDNET
(Jul. 23, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/article/uk-to-automatically-filter-adult-internet-content/
(reporting that the filters can only be deactivated by an account holder, who must be an adult).
170. See Ryan Neal, UK Porn Filter: Censorship Extends Beyond Pornography, But One
ISP Is Fighting Back, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jul. 26, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ukporn-filter-censorship-extends-beyond-pornography-one-isp-fighting-back-1361379 (reporting
leaks that linked the filters to controversial Chinese company, Huawei); see also Jim Killock,
Sleepwalking Into Censorship, OPEN RIGHTS GROUP (Jul. 25, 2013), https://
www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2013/sleepwalking-into-censorship
(recommending
an
alternative to default filtering).
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To summarize, the United Kingdom has traditionally operated a
libertarian model of Internet governance.171 Although there is heavy
filtering regarding child pornography and illegal content, the filtering
is the result of citizen action and reviewed by offline legislation.172
3. Intellectual Property Law: United Kingdom
Similar to the United States, the United Kingdom is also a
member party of the Berne Convention, the WIPO and the WIPO
Treaty.173 Consequently, the United Kingdom is required to
implement legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures.174 As a member of
the European Union, the United Kingdom has implemented the bloc’s
directives into their repertoire of intellectual property laws.175
The E-Commerce Directive establishes transparency and
information requirements for online service providers, and a
intermediary liability system.176 Section 4, Articles 12 to 15 of the
Directive establish the framework for intermediary liability in the
form of a “notice-and-action” system.177

171. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (describing that the United
Kingdom has traditionally operated a libertarian approach in respects to the Internet).
172. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (describing the IWF’s assessment of
reported content in accords to “offline” laws).
173. The United Kingdom ratified the Berne Convention on September 5, 1887. See
WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing a list of the
members of the Berne Convention). The United Kingdom ratified the WIPO Treaty on
December 14, 2009. See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROPERTY ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (last visited Dec. 30,
2014) (list of WIPO Treaty parties).
174. WIPO Treaty, supra note 109, art. 11.
175. The United Kingdom implemented the EU E-Commerce Directive by enacting the
Electronic Commerce Regulations of 2002. See The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive)
Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2001/2555 (U.K.).
176. See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament on Certain Legal Aspects of
Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market
(Directive on Electronic Commerce), 2000 O.J. L 178/1 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive];
E-Commerce Directive, Introduction to the Directive, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/directive/index_en.htm#maincontentSec1
(last
visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing an overview of the E-Commerce Directive).
177. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 177, § 12, art. 12-15; see Notice-and-Action
Procedures, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/noticeand-action/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing an overview of the ECommerce Directive’s notice-and-action procedure).
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Pursuant to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive, providers
that store third party content on their servers may not be held liable
for the content unless the service provider fails to expeditiously
remove or block access to the content upon obtaining actual
knowledge of the content’s illegality or upon becoming aware of facts
or circumstances that indicate illegal activity.178 Similar to the
criticisms of the DMCA in the United States, there are concerns that
the E-Commerce Directive’s notice-and-action procedure possibly
chills freedom of expression.179 Critics argue that because service
providers risk liability if the content is not expeditiously removed, it
is likely that host service providers will systematically take down any
alleged unlawful material when a notification is received.180
Moreover, unlike the DMCA, the E-Commerce Directive does not
require Member States to implement “put back” procedures.181
Following the footsteps of New Zealand and France, the United
Kingdom enacted the Digital Economy Act 2010 (“DEA”), a
graduated response law.182 The DEA establishes the framework of the
law, and delegates the implementation and specific details to be later
drafted by the Office of Communications (“OFCOM”) in an Initial
Obligations Code.183 Under the DEA, once a copyright holder files a
copyright infringement report, the ISP is required to notify the
reported subscriber to cease the illegal activity and offer the
178. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 177, § 12, art. 14 (explaining hosting liability).
179. See Rosa Julià-Barceló & Kamiel J. Koelman, Intermediary Liability In The ECommerce Directive: So Far So Good, But It's Not Enough, 16 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY
REV. 231, 234-39 (2000) (arguing that the E-Commerce Directive threatens freedom of speech
and fair competition); see also Pablo Baistrocchi, Liability of Intermediary Service Providers
in the EU Directive on Electronic Commerce 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J
111, 130 (2002) (discussing that the loopholes in the directive present an impracticable future).
180. See Julià-Barceló & Koelman, supra note 179, at 231 (explaining that on-line
intermediaries have an incentive to systematically take down material without hearing from the
party whose material is removed); infra notes 275-92 and accompanying text (discussing
similar effects on Internet speech by the DMCA).
181. “Put back” procedures are the processes of putting the alleged infringing material
back on the website after going through the statutorily enumerated or court ordered processes.
See Baistrocchi, supra note 180, at 125 (arguing that the E-Commerce Directive should
implement “put back” procedures); Julià-Barceló & Koelman, supra note 180, at 238-39
(calling for Member States to implement appropriate procedures on notice, take-down and “put
back”).
182. As the name suggests, a graduated response law incorporates escalating sanctions
for repeated offenders. See Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24 (U.K.) [hereinafter DEA].
183. See DEA, §§ 5-6 (U.K.). Sections 5 & 6 of the DEA establishes the process and
requirements for approval of the initial obligations code. See id. Section 7 establishes the
skeleton framework for DEA and leaves the details to OFCOM. See id. § 7.
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subscriber advice on how to prevent further infractions of the law.184
Pursuant to § 4, ISPs are required to maintain a list of subscribers who
have reached the OFCOM-determined threshold number of
infringements.185 This list must also be provided to copyright holders
upon their request.186 One potentially troubling aspect of the DEA is
that repeat offenders risk facing increasing sanctions that may limit or
even cut off their Internet connection.187
In July 2010, TalkTalk, a UK ISP, joined BT in seeking the
judicial review of the DEA, arguing that the act was rushed through
parliament before the general election and without proper
consideration of its effect on human rights and businesses.188 On
November 10, 2010, the High Court of Justice, the UK court that
hears appeals and first instance cases, granted review permission.189
The High Court ruled in favor of the government on April 20,
2011.190 High Court Judge Kenneth Parker considered the DEA "a
more efficient, focused, and fair system than the current
arrangement.”191 On March 6, 2012, TalkTalk and BT lost their final
appeal against the implementation of the DEA.192
184.
185.
186.
187.

See id. § 3.
See id. § 4.
See id.
See id. § 9; see also Robert Andrews, Digital Economy Bill: A Quick Guide, THE
GUARDIAN, (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2010/apr/08/digitaleconomy-bill-quick-guide-45-measures (discussing the main points of the DEA).
188. BT and TalkTalk Challenge Digital Economy Act, BBC (July 8, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/10542400 (“The act became law shortly before parliament was dissolved
in the so-called wash-up period. It meant it was subject to a shorter debate than other acts”);
Josh Halliday, BT and TalkTalk Granted Judicial Review of Digital Economy Act, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2010, 9:20 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/nov/10/
bt-talktalk-digital-economy-act (reporting that both broadband providers was granted review
of the act at the high court to clarify whether it conflicts with existing EU legislation).
189. Halliday, supra note 189 (reporting that the High Court of Justice granted review
permission); Digital Economy Act to Be Reviewed by Courts and Parliament, OUT-LAW.COM
(Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.out-law.com/page-11538 (“The High Court has said that it will
review the law to see if it is in conflict with EU laws on privacy and ISPs' liabilities for users'
behaviour.”).
190. See R v. Sec’y of State for Bus., Innovation and Skills, [2011] EWHC (Admin)
1021 (U.K.); see also Digital Economy Act Judicial Review, GOV.UK (Apr. 20, 2011), https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/digital-economy-act-judicial-review (reporting that UK Justice
Kenneth Parker upheld the principle of taking measures to tackle the unlawful downloading
copyright material).
191. R v. Sec’y of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, [2011] EWHC (Admin)
1021, [H9] (U.K.) (holding that the DEA is not disproportionate restriction on right to free
expression or to impart and receive information); see Andrew Orlowski, What Now for the
Anti-Piracy Law?, THE REG. (Apr. 21 2011), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/04/21/
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D. China: Isolation Behind the Great Firewall
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China establishes
the framework and principles of government and enumerates the
rights of Chinese citizens.193 Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution
provides that “[c]itizens of the [PRC] enjoy freedom of speech, of the
press, of assembly, of association, of recession and of
demonstration.”194 Similar to the United States, China’s constitutional
protection of freedom of expression is not absolute.195 The PRC’s
Constitution expressly limits freedoms that infringe upon the interests
of the state, society, or other citizens.196 Moreover, government
regulations further restrict the freedom of speech, such as the
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration
of Audio-Visual Products, and the Regulations on Broadcasting and
Television Administration, which prohibit the distribution and

digital_economy_act_high_court/ (reporting that High Justice Parker repeatedly disagreed with
the objecting ISP’s interpretation of the Act).
192. See Kelly Fiveash, BT, TalkTalk Lose Final Appeal Against Digital Economy Act,
THE REG. (Mar. 6, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/03/06/bt_talktalk
_lose_final_appeal_against_digital_economy_act/ (reporting that Lady Justice Arden, Lord
Justice Richards and Lord Justice Patten al upheld the High Court's earlier judgment on all
grounds other than on the matter of costs); Josh Halliday, BT and TalkTalk Lose Challenge
Against Digital Economy Act, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2012/mar/06/Internet-provider-lose-challenge-digital-economy-act (reporting that
the government can begin implementing the Digital Economy Act).
193. See Guosong Shao, The Chinese Legal System, in INTERNET LAW OF CHINA, 1, 2
(2012) (discussing the background information of the Chinese legal system); see also Robert
Koeze & Thomas Rimmer, Constitutional Law, CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT, available at
http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/english-law-summaries/constitutional-law/ (last visited Dec. 30,
2014) (providing an overview of the PRC’s Constitution). See generally XIANFA (1982)
(China) (enumerating the rights of citizens and establishing the framework for the judicial,
legislative and executive branch).
194. XIANFA art. 35 (2004) (China) (“A citizen of the People’s Republic of China has
right to the freedom of speech, of press, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration.”).
Since the PRC was found in 1949, the National People’s Congress has adopted four
constitutions, all of which provided for the protection of the freedom of expression. See James
Liu, China, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
111803/China/258953/Constitutional-framework (last visited Apr. 5, 2015) (providing a
general overview of China’s consitutitonal history).
195. See XIANFA art. 51 (2004) (China); Guosong Shao, Internet Speech, in INTERNET
LAW OF CHINA, 49, 49-53 (2012) [hereinafter Shao, Internet Speech] (explaining that the PRC
Constitution stipulates that a citizen’s exercise of their freedoms and rights may not infringe
upon the interest of the state, society, and other citizens).
196. See XIANFA art. 51 (2004) (China); Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 49-53
(describing the enumerated limitations on speech).
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broadcast of matters that endanger the nation’s unity and sovereignty,
and territorial integrity, respectively.197
1. Regulations from the Down Up
The Internet presents the Chinese government with the
conundrum of maintaining economic growth provided by the
Internet’s global reach while preserving its political and ideological
control free from international influences.198 Internet activity in China
is regulated through infrastructure and the legal framework, involving
various government agencies and criminal or financial sanctions.199
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (“MIIT”)
regulates telecommunications, such as the Internet, and oversees
telecommunication regulatory agencies in all Chinese provinces,
autonomous regions, and municipalities.200 In addition, similar to the
United States, the Internet is regulated by different agencies based on
197. See Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 53 (detailing the numerous laws and
regulations that restrict speech); see, e.g., Yinxiang Zhipin Guanli Tiaoli Shixiao
(音像制品管理条例[失效) [Regulations on the Administration of Audio and Video Products]
(promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Dec. 7, 2013) (Lawinfochina)
(China) (prohibiting the distribution of in audio-visual products that may endanger the “unity
and territorial integrity of the nation and sovereignty of the State;”); Guangbo Dianshi Guanli
Tiaoli (广播电视管理条例) [Regulations on Broadcasting and Television Administration]
(promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 11, 1997, effective Sept. 1, 1997) (Lawinfochina)
(China) (prohibiting broadcasting stations from producing or broadcasting content that
endangers the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country); Chuban Guanli Tiaoli
(出版管理条例) [Regulations on the Administration of Publication] (promulgated by the State
Council, Dec. 25, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2002) (Lawinfochina) (China) (prohibiting the
publication of any content that includes, inter alia, the propagation of evil cults or superstition
and content that disturbs public order or public stability).
198. See Xiaoru Wang, Behind the Great Firewall: The Internet and Democratization of
China (2009) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with University
of Michigan Library) (explaining that China’s extensive Internet censorship is a result of the
government attempting to maintain ideological control); see also, Shao, supra note 196, at 5881 (describing China’s attempt to restrict Internet speech that may endanger national security
and stability).
199. See Aaron D. McGeary, China's Great Balancing Act: Maximizing the Internet's
Benefits While Limiting Its Detriments, 35 Int'l Law. 219, 224-30 (2001) (describing the PRC’s
efforts to regulate the Internet). See generally Guosong Shao, Regulating the Internet, in
INTERNET LAW OF CHINA, 25, 30-44 (2012) [hereinafter Shao, Regulating the Internet)
(describing the various methods that People’s Republic of China employs to regulate the
Internet).
200. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 31 (explaining that according
to PRC Telecommunications Regulations, the Internet is part of the telecommunications
business); see also Major Responsibilities, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL,
http://www.gov.cn/english//2005-10/02/content_74176.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2014)
(explaining the role of the MIIT).
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the specific Internet activity.201 For instance, China’s General
Administration of Press and Publication (“GAPP”) regulates Internet
publishing, and the State Administration of Radio Film and
Television (“SARFT”) regulates websites providing audio-visual
programs.202
In addition to the involvement of various agencies, numerous
laws regulate behavior and content on the Internet.203 For instance,
unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, the MIIT has
established regulations with strict intermediary liability for Internet
content providers, bulletin board systems, or other user-generated
content sites, for the content published on their sites.204 Under the
National People’s Congress (“NPC”) Standing Committee’s Decision
on Preserving Computer Network Security, citizens are forbidden
from using the Internet to incite secession, divulge state secrets,
advocate for the overthrow of state power and the socialist system,
provoke ethnic hatred or discrimination, or to propagate violent
resistance to law enforcement.205
201. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 31 ((describing the roles of the
government agencies); Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, http://www.cecc.gov/agencies-responsible-for-censorshipin-china (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (detailing the various agencies that are responsible for
China’s censorship).
202. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 31 ((describing the roles of
GAPP and SARFT in regards to the internet); Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, http://www.cecc.gov/agencies-responsiblefor-censorship-in-china (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (detailing the various agencies that are
responsible for China’s censorship).
203. See infra notes 204-09 (detailing various laws that regulate the Internet in China).
204. See Hulianwang Dianzi Gongao Fuwu Guanli (互联网电子公告服务管理规定)
[Management Provisions on Electronic Bulletin Services in Internet] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Information and Industry, Nov. 6 2000, effective Nov. 6, 2000) (Lawinfochina)
(China) (requiring service providers that find illegal content listed in their system to
immediately delete the content, keep relevant records, and report the findings to the
authorities); ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING
265 (Jonathan Zittrain et al. eds., 2008) (noting that Internet content providers are directly
responsible for what is published on their site); see also Internet Intermediaries, supra note 18,
at 7 (explaining that China has adopted a strict intermediary liability approach).
205. Quanguo Rwn Da Chang Weihuì Guanyu Weihu Hulianwang Anquan De Juedìng
(全国人大常委会关于维护互联网安全的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress on Preserving Computer Network Security] (promulgated by
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Dec. 28, 2000, effective Dec. 28,
2000) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter Decision on Preserving Computer Network
Security] (prohibiting specified conduct on the Internet); see Shao, Internet Speech, supra note
195, at 73 (referring to the regulation as the “Decision on Safeguarding Internet Security” as
an acceptable alternative translation of the title).
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In an effort to protect children and moral values, the PRC further
prohibits the production and dissemination of pornographic
materials.206 The Criminal Law defines pornography as “materials
that explicitly describe sexual conduct or blatantly appeal to the
prurient interests.”207 The Decision on Preserving Computer Network
Security extends the prohibition of pornography to the Internet by
criminalizing the establishment of pornographic websites and
services.208 This expansion to the Internet has prompted the Supreme
People’s Court, the highest court in the PRC, and the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate, the highest prosecutorial agency, to publish
judicial interpretation guidelines in order to clarify the standard for
criminal liability, and to delineate the factors for determining whether
a website is pornographic.209

206. China’s prohibition of pornography can be traced to the 1979 revision of China’s
Criminal Law. See Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 73 (explaining the history of
PRC’s prohibition of pornography); see Ningzhu Zhu, Porn Crackdown Crucial to Cyber
Development: Experts, XINHUA NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
china/2014-04/16/c_133267415.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) ((quoting Han Jun, Deputy
Dean of the School of Journalism and Communication at Northwest University) (“[r]ampant
pornography has disrupted social order and tainted the image of the country as a whole, casting
a bad influence on the public, particularly minors”)).
207. Section 9 Article 367 prohibits the production, sale or dissemination of obscene
materials, with the exception of scientific products, literary, and artistic works. Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (97 Xiuding) (中华人民共和国刑法 (97修订)) [Criminal Law of
the People's Republic of China (97 Revision)] (promulgated by National People's Congress,
Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1 1997) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter Criminal Law].
208. See Decision on Preserving Computer Network Security, supra note 213, § 3(5)
(prohibiting the establishment of pornographic web sites); see also Shao, Internet Speech,
supra note 196, at 86-89 (explaining China’s attempts to prohibit pornography).
209. The 2010 Interpretation was a revision of the original Supreme People’s Courts
interpretation issued in 2004. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan
Guanyu Banli Liyong Hulianwang, Yidong Tongxun Zhongduan, Shengxuntai Zhizuo, Fuzhi,
Chuban, Fanmai, Chuanbo Yinhui Dianzi Xinxi Xingshi Anjian Juti Yìngyong Falu Ruogan
Wentí De Jieshi (最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理利用互联网、移动通讯终端
、声讯台制作、复制、出版、贩卖、传播淫秽电子信息刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题
的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate
on Several Issues Concerning the Concrete Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal
Cases of Making, Reproducing, Publishing, Selling and Spreading Pornographic Electronic
Information by Means of the Internet, Terminal of Mobile Communications and Sound
Message Stations] (promulgated by Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate
Feb. 2, 2010, effective Feb. 4, 2010) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter 2010 Judicial
Interpretation] (interpreting the application of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of
China and Decision on Computer Network Security in respect to online pornography).
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Furthermore, the PRC prohibits the propagation of cults on the
Internet.210 While the Chinese Constitution provides a right to
religion, the People’s Supreme Court defines a cult as an illegal
organization that hides behind religion, Qigong, or other supernatural
beliefs.211 In addition, the PRC treats cults as organizations that intend
to jeopardize public order and social stability.212 The emergence of
the Internet has provided these alleged cults with new avenues to
spread their message to a wider audience.213 For instance, in 1999 the
Chinese government banned the Falun Gong, an organization
practicing Qigong, an ancient Chinese practice that integrates
physical postures, breathing techniques, and meditation.214 Since then,

210. Decision on Preserving Computer Network Security, supra note 213, § 2(4)
(criminalizing the “use of the computer network to form cult organizations or contact members
of cult organizations . . . .”); Article 300 of the Criminal Law prohibits people from using cult
organizations or superstitions to undermine law enforcement. Criminal Law, supra note 207,
art. 300.
211. XINFA art. 36 (stating that no organization or individual may compel citizens to
believe in, or not to believe in, any religion). The right to religious practice in China is limited.
See Religious Freedom in China, BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE, AND WORLD AFF.
AT GEORGETOWN U., http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/religious-freedom-in-china
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (describing the PRC’s regulation of religion within China). The
government protects what it calls "normal religious activity," which is restricted to
government-sanctioned religious organizations and registered places of worship. See id..
Zuigao Renmín Fayuan, Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Banli Zuzhi He Liyong Xiejiao
Zuzhi
Fanzuì
Anjian
Juti
Yingyong
Falu
Ruogan
Wentí
De
Jieshi
(最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理组织和利用邪教组织犯罪案件具体应用法律
若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's
Procuratorate on the Concrete Application of Law on Handling the Cases of Committing
Crimes by Organizing and Using Cult Organizations] (promulgated by Supreme People's
Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Oct. 9, 1999, effective Oct. 9, 1999) (Lawinfochina)
(China) (interpreting the application of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China in
regards to prosecution of cults and cultists) [hereinafter PRC Cult Regulation]; see also Shao,
Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 90 (explaining China’s prohibition of cults).
212. See PRC Cult Regulation, supra note 211 (defining the term cult).
213. See James Tong, An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure,
Communications, Financing, CHINA Q., Sept. 2002, at 639 (discussing how the Internet played
a large role in spreading the Falungong’s message); see also Shao, Regulating the Internet,
supra note 199, at 91 (explaining how Chinese cults have used the Internet to disseminate their
views).
214. What distinguishes the Falun Gong from typical Qigong practices is that the Falun
Gong has deified their Qigong Master, Li Hongzhi. See Christopher Chaney, The Despotic
State Department in Refugee Law: Creating Legal Fictions to Support Falun Gong Asylum
Claims, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 4 (2005) (discussing the Falun Gong’s deification of Li);
see also Who is Li Hongzhi?, BBC (May 8, 2011) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/
1223317.stm (“Li Hongzhi, a former trumpet-player from north-east China, is known as
‘Living Buddha’ to his devotees.”).
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the Falun Gong has mainly used the Internet to circulate its doctrines,
recruit members, and organize activities.215
2. Behind the Great Firewall of China
The PRC further exercises extensive control over its internal
Internet architecture.216 Open Net Initiative, a joint project that
examines and reports countries’ Internet filtering practices, reported
that China’s filtering has grown continuously more refined,
sophisticated, and targeted.217 China’s network is divided into two
tiers, the backbone networks and the access networks.218 The
backbone networks run through internationally-leased circuits that
connect China to international websites.219 In the United States and
the United Kingdom, a significant percentage of backbone networks
are operated and owned by private companies.220 However, in China,
the original four backbone networks are controlled and monitored by
various government agencies.221 Because Internet data enters China
215. See Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 195, at 91 (discussing cult’s use of the
Internet in China); see also Tong, supra note 214, at 647 (describing the Falun Gong’s use of
the Internet).
216. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 42-46 (2012) (describing how
the major telecommunications operations and Internet content providers are required to take
measures to prevent the dissemination of illegal information on the Internet); Open Net
Initiative, China, OPEN NET INITIATIVE 276-85 available at http://access.opennet.net/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-china.pdf (discussing the various technical filtering
measures employed by the PRC).
217. See Open Net Initiative, China, supra note 216, at 276-82 (“Despite the rapid
spread of Internet access throughout its vast population, China also has one of the largest and
most sophisticated Internet filtering systems in the world.”); Lee & Liu, supra note 71, at 129
(describing the recent “extraordinary growth” in China’s Internet infrastructure).
218. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 42 (describing the two-tier
system); see also Lee & Liu, supra note 71, at 133 (noting that while filters have been installed
on different layers of China's Internet, it has been constructed primarily at the backbone
network).
219. See Backbone Definition, COMPUTER HOPE, http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/
b/backbone.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (defining backbone network); Backbone
Definition, TECHTERMS, http://www.techterms.com/definition/backbone (last visited Dec. 31,
2014) (defining backbone network).
220. See, e.g., Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 877 (noting that most of
the relevant Internet infrastructure in America, such as the network backbone, routers, and
access points, are privately owned); Christopher Williams, ISP Condemns New BT Backbone,
THE REG. (July 1, 2010), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/07/01/aa_bt/ (last visited Dec. 30,
2014) (reporting criticisms about BT’s backbones unable to handle current demand).
221. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 42 (discussing several of
backbone networks in China); China Mobile Users 2012, ONBILE (Jan. 25, 2013), http://
www.onbile.com/info/china-mobile-users-2012/ (discussing that individuals and businesses
are only allowed to rent bandwidth from state networks).
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through a limited set of entry points controlled by governmental
agencies, the Chinese government is able to regulate the flow of
information by controlling these entry points.222
China’s backbone-level filtering system, officially designated
the “Golden Shield Project” (金盾工程) is commonly referred to as
the “Great Firewall of China,” a reference to the Great Wall of
China.223 Unlike typical firewall systems, however, the Great Firewall
of China forms a “virtual ring around an entire country.”224 The
second tier of China’s network systems, the access networks, is a
system of intermediate networks that connect through the backbone
networks to the international Internet.225 All of China’s access
networks are required to implement technical measures to prevent the
dissemination of illegal and harmful information in cyberspace.226 For
instance, access networks are required to record a customer’s account
number, phone numbers, and IP address.227
It is clear that maintaining national security and social stability
are some of the PRC’s utmost important objectives.228 By regulating
the Internet from the ground up, the PRC is able to control the data
that enters and leaves its borders at the infrastructure level while
maintaining compliance from its end-user citizens with their broad
222. See Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas Are Watching: China's Censorship of the
Internet and the Strain on Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 577, 585-86 (2007)
(noting that the MIIT ensures that government control exists at every juncture); Lee & Liu,
supra note 71, at 133 (discussing PRC’s attempts to control the limited Internet connection
points).
223. Similar to the Great Wall’s purpose to defend against marauding invaders, the Great
Firewall denotes China’s attempt to block undesirable content from its “netizens.” See Lee &
Liu, supra note 70, at 133 (describing the firewall project); Jennifer Shyu, Speak No Evil:
Circumventing Chinese Censorship, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 225-28 (2008)] (describing
the goals of the firewall project); see also Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 876
(discussing PRC’s implementation of filters at access point).
224. See Lee & Liu, supra note 70, at 133 (describing the firewall’s pervasive filtering);
Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 43 (explaining the different ways the Golden
Shield Project can block information).
225. See Lee & Liu, supra note 71, at 133 (describing that the lower layer networks
connect through the upper layer networks to the international networks); Shao, Regulating the
Internet, supra note 199, at 42 (describing how China’s Internet is divided into two tiers)
226. See supra notes 223-25 (explaining the technical measures utilized at the backbone
level); infra note 227 (explaining the measures implemented at access networks).
227. See Farrell, supra note 222, at 586 (explaining that Internet Access Points must
record a customer's account number, phone number and IP address); Open Net Initiative,
China, supra note 16, at 284 (noting that Internet Information Service providers are required to
store records for 60 days and provide records to authorities upon demand).
228. See supra notes 206-15 and accompanying text (describing China’s attempt to
regulate the Internet in furtherance of maintaining “social stability,” and “national security”).
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censorship laws.229 China’s model of Internet censorship is evocative
of Lawrence Lessig’s “code-is-law,” which provides that “code”—
i.e., software or hardware—can have a similar effect to the way legal
regulation affects one’s behavior.230 Professor Lee and Professor Liu
posit that, “one of the most profound consequences of [China’s
Internet] architecture is not that it immediately limits citizens' access
to sensitive foreign content, but that it is gradually shaping human
behavior in cyberspace.”231
It is clear that the censorship policies of the United States,
United Kingdom, and China embody different philosophies and
values.232 For instance, while each country appears to agree on
protecting children from inappropriate material, such as pornography,
each country approaches the problem differently.233 The United States
regulates the Internet through legislative attempts.234 The United
Kingdom passively designates a watchdog role to a nongovernment
organization.235 China attempts to exercise near-complete domination
over the Internet activity within its borders.236
II. ARTICLE 19 ANALYSIS
Part II of this Note analyzes each country’s Internet censorship
model under Article 19 of the ICCPR. Section A will analyze the US
legislative approach, specifically the possible conflicts of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act with Article 19. Section B examines
229. See supra notes 199-227 and accompanying text (explaining China’s holistic
approach to Internet censorship).
230. See Lawrence Lessig, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 5
(2006) (discussing how code regulates behavior on cyberspace); see also Lee & Liu, supra
note 70, at 26 (utilizing Lessig’s theory, Professors Lee and Professor Liu analyzes China’s
censorship scheme’s effect on its citizen).
231. Professor Jyh-An Lee is an Assistant Professor of Law at National Chengchi
University, Taiwan. Professor Ching-Yi Liu is a Professor of Law at National Taiwan
University, Taiwan. See Lee & Liu, supra note 70, at 145.
232. Compare supra notes 77-141 (discussing the United States’ legislative model), with
supra notes 142-192 (discussing the United Kingdom’s approach to Internet regulations), and
supra notes 199-227 (detailing the PRC’s control over their internal Internet activities).
233. Compare supra notes 79-106 (discussing CDA, COPA, and CIPA), with supra
notes 151-65 (discussing the role of the IWF), and supra notes 207-10 (detailing the PRC’s
prohibition of pornography).
234. See supra notes 79-141 (describing the various legislative attempts to censor
Internet content).
235. See supra notes 147-67 (discussing the United Kingdom’s support of the IWF).
236. See supra notes 199-227 (explaining the PRC’s extensive control of internal
Internet use).
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Article 19’s compatibility with the United Kingdom’s cooperation
with the Internet Watch Foundation, and the United Kingdom’s recent
adoption of the Digital Economy Act. Finally, as the PRC has not
ratified the ICCPR, Section C will look at the potential Article 19
violations committed by the PRC’s extensive manipulation and
regulation of the Internet. As expected, no nation has a perfect model
of Internet censorship. This analysis will, however, provide a better
understanding of the strengths and possible deficiencies of applying
Article 19 to the Internet.
Whether a restriction is considered permissible inevitably evokes
a struggle among respect of state sovereignty, cultural and moral
differences, and promotion of individual human rights.237 This
struggle is evident in Hertzberg v. Finland, in which the HRC could
not find an Article 19 violation in a Finnish broadcaster’s decision to
censor two programs involving homosexuality. 238 The HRC noted
that public morals differ widely between countries and that there is no
universally common standard of morality.239 Therefore, “a certain
margin of discretion must be accorded to the responsible national
authorities.”240 Despite the lack of success after Hertzberg, State
parties have continued to argue for a “margin of discretion” in HRC
cases.241
The Internet is arguably unlike any of its predecessors, and the
vast potential and benefits of the Internet are the result of its unique
characteristics, such as its unparalleled speed, ubiquity, and relative
237. See Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 61/1979, Leo Hertzberg et al. v. Finland,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985) [hereinafter Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n]
(holding that public morals differ); Carlson, supra note 26, at 122-23 (explaining that
application of Article 19(3) is uneven).
238. See Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n, supra note 239, ¶ 2.1.
239. See Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n, supra note 238, ¶ 10.3; see also
Ambika Kumar, Using Courts to Enforce the Free Speech Provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 351, 353 (2006) (discussing how the
Human Rights Committee has adjudicated Article 19 matters inconsistently); Carlson, supra
note 18, at 122 (explaining the significance of Hertzberg).
240. Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n, supra note 238, ¶ 10.3.
241. See Andrew Legg, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 131 (2012) (stating that states have continued to make the case for deference
before the HRC)). But see SARAH JOSEPH & JENNY SCHULTZ, et al., THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 527 (2d ed. 2004) (describing that after
Hertzberg, the HRC has never disposed any other Article 19 case by reference to the State
Party’s “margin of discretion”); but see also Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 511/1992,
Länsman et al. v. Finland, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994) (unwilling to assess an
Article 27 violation by reference to a margin of appreciation).
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anonymity.242 The Special Rapporteur recognized that due to their
very nature, many regulations or restrictions that may be legitimate
and proportionate for traditional media, such as defamation laws, are
often not as effective with regards to the Internet.243
While governments typically agree that Internet content should
be regulated, their norms justifying filtering differ widely.244 For
instance, people from the United States would likely disapprove of
Saudi Arabia’s pervasive filtering predicated on Shari’ah law.245
However, Saudi Arabian residents might similarly object to US
tolerance of pornography and alcohol consumption.246
Even among democratic countries, justifications for contentrestriction diverge.247 This contrast in norms is evident in the case
Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme v. Yahoo!, Inc.248 In 2000,
Yahoo! operated a United States-based auction page, targeted towards
Americans, that posted Nazi memorabilia for auction.249 However, the
French Criminal Code prohibits the sale of Nazi memorabilia.250
Article R645-1 criminalizes the display of uniforms, insignias, or
emblems that are associated with “organizations responsible for
crimes against humanity,” which are not being used for the purposes
of a movie, show, or historical pageant.251 Because anyone from
242. See The Internet: Challenges, Opportunities and Prospects, INT’L TELECOMM.
UNION (May 17, 2001), http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/wtd/2001/ExecutiveSummary.html
(reporting on the prospective benefits of the Internet); August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note
52, at 5 (noting the unprecedented level of communication provided by the Internet).
243. The Special Rapporteur used the example of defamation of an individual’s
reputation. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 8. (“[G]iven the ability of the
individual concerned to exercise his/her right of reply instantly to restore the harm caused, the
types of sanctions that are applied to offline defamation may be unnecessary or
disproportionate.”).
244. See infra notes 246-47 (providing an example of justifications for Internet
regulations based on different cultural norms).
245. See Internet Rules, 2001, Council of Ministers Resolution (Feb. 12, 2001), (Saudi
Arabia) available at http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2014)
(proscribing specific Internet activities and content) [hereinafter Saudi Internet Rules]; Internet
Filtering in Saudi Arabia, OPENNET INITIATIVE, https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/
ONI_SaudiArabia_2009.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (reporting the extent of Internet
filtering in Saudi Arabia).
246. See supra Part I.B (discussing the United States’ model of Internet regulation).
247. See infra notes 248-54 (discussing the controversy in Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue
Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006)).
248. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006) (providing the background of the French Superior Court case).
249. See id. at 1202.
250. See CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. R645-1 (Fr.).
251. Id.
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France can visit the Yahoo! auction, the plaintiffs, the League Against
Racism and Anti-Semitism, argued that Yahoo! was in violation of
Article R645-1 of the French Penal Code.252
Upon finding that Yahoo! Inc. had violated the Article R645-1,
the Superior Court of Paris ordered Yahoo! Inc. to take measures that
would prevent French Internet users from receiving Nazi content.253
While Yahoo! France, Yahoo! Inc.’s French subsidiary, was quick to
follow the French Court’s order, Yahoo! Inc.’s US office resisted the
French order and filed suit in US District Court for the Northern
District of California seeking a declaratory judgment that the French
Court Order was unenforceable in the United States.254 This case
illustrates the possible conflicts produced by divergent norms and
laws, and the Internet’s border-defying nature.255
There are currently a variety of theories on the government’s
role vis-à-vis the Internet.256 For instance, cyber-libertarians, such as
John Perry Barlow, argue that access to content on the Internet should
remain unfettered.257 Other scholars, such as Thomas Schultz, espouse
a Helgian-model, arguing that sovereign nations must safeguard local
values through filtering mechanisms.258 Recognizing the deficiencies
in current theoretical approaches to Internet filtering, Professor
Bambauer proposes that censorship practices should be evaluated

252. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1202 (discussing LICRA’s cease and desist letter to
Yahoo!, Inc).
253. See id. at 1202.
254. See id. at 1224 (holding that action was subject to dismissal because the issue was
unripe).
255. See supra notes 248-54 (discussing the conflict between the countries’ differing
norms of freedom of expression).
256. See infra notes 257-59 (describing different views regarding the government’s role
vis-à-vis the Internet).
257. In his 1996 work, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, John Perry
Barlow prophetically conveys the current struggles governments encounter with regulating the
Internet. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996), http://
homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (“Your legal concepts of property, expression,
identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is
no matter here.”); see also Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6,
1993, at 62 (quoting John Gilmore) (“The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes
around it.")).
258. See Thomas Schultz, Carving up the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, and the
Private/Public International Law Interface, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 799, 806-10 (2008) (proposing
a social-contract justification for filtering the Internet).

2015]

BRINGING IN A NEW SCALE

along the process-based metric
narrowness, and accountability.259

of

openness,

867
transparency,

A. Article 19 Analysis of the United States: What to do with the
DMCA?
The cumulative test of Article 19(3) encompasses principles of
predictability and transparency.260 Openness and transparency of
government are often considered key pillars of a democratic
society.261 In a 2009 memorandum, President Obama instructed the
head of executive agencies to focus on three principles of an open
government: (1) transparency, (2) participation, and (3)
collaboration.262 The memo requires, among other things, executive
departments and agencies to: publish government information online;
improve the quality of government information; create an
environment conducive to transparency, participation, and
collaboration on ongoing projects; and reform policy framework to
realize the potential of technology.263
US laws regarding Internet governance, whether through cases
or regulations, are readily available to the public.264 The effects of
259. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390-410 (2009) (establishing a
framework for analyzing the legitimacy of a country’s censorship system); Bambauer, Orwell's
Armchair, supra note 10, at 900-43 (utilizing the framework to examine the legitimacy of soft
censorship systems).
260. See Land, supra note 48, at 426 (explaining Article 19(3) restrictions); May 2011
La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 8 (explaining the three-part cumulative test).
261. See JON GANT AND NICOLE TURNER-LEE, GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY: SIX
STRATEGIES FOR MORE OPEN AND PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT, 13-15 (2011) (“A core
pillar of democratic society is the interaction between government and the governed.”); cf.
August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 6 (reporting that the Internet can primarily be
used as a positive tool to increase transparency over the conduct of those in power, access
diverse sources of information, facilitate active citizen participation in building democratic
societies).
262. See Memorandum from the Office of Mgmt and Budget on Open Gov’t Directive to
the Head Executive Dep’ts and Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf (“The three
principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration form the cornerstone of an open
government) [hereinafter Open Directive]; Memorandum from the Office of Press Sec’y on
Transparency and Open Gov’t to the Head Executive Dep’ts and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009),
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20090121/2009_transparency_memo.pdf
(directing the Chief of the Office of Management and Budget to coordinate with Executive
agencies to implement the Open Directive).
263. See Open Directive, supra note 263, at 2-8 (establishing the plans to implement the
Open Directive).
264. There have been numerous Acts passed to increase government transparency. For
instance, the Freedom of Information Act and its amendments, allows full or partial disclosure
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these laws on speech, however, are not always apparent. In 2010,
Google launched its Transparency Report to “provide hard evidence
of how laws and policies affect access to information online.”265
Utilizing Google’s Transparency Reports, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (“EFF”) compiled a list of takedowns that appear to
involve possible misuse of the DMCA.266 The EFF’s findings are
indicative of scholars’ apprehension of DMCA § 512.267
The latter aspects of Article 19(3) involve principles of
legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality. Attempts at “hard
censorship” in the United States are often met with constitutional
scrutiny. Recent landmark cases on Internet censorship demonstrate
that the courts look to the proportionality of the regulation vis-à-vis
the government interest and the legitimacy of the interest.268 Contentbased regulations are often strictly scrutinized.269 In order for the
regulation to survive, the government must show that the limitation
serves a compelling state interest and that the means employed are
necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.270
Restrictions on speech may not be overbroad.271 In Reno, Justice
Steven’s opinion noted that the government failed to state why a less

of previously unreleased government information and documents. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552
(2009). Moreover, the United States codifies its statutes and regularly publishes its courts
opinions.
REPORT,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/
265. See
TRANSPARENCY
transparencyreport/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing reports about takedown requests
that Google receives).
266. See Parker Higgins, Top 10 Takedowns in Google's Copyright Transparency
Report, Electronic Frontier Found. (July 5, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/07/top10-takedowns-googles-copyright-transparency-report (noting that these dubious takedown
show that the DMCA's notice-and-takedown procedures are ripe for abuse).
267. See infra notes 275-92 (examining the indirect chilling effects caused by § 512).
268. See supra notes 80-94 (examining United States Supreme Court cases involving
CDA §223 and COPA).
269. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995) (noting that the government must abstain from regulating speech when “the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.”).
270. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999) aff'd, 217 F.3d
162 (3d Cir. 2000) vacated sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (explaining that
the government may regulate the content of such protected speech to promote a compelling
governmental interest if the government chooses the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest).
271. See UN General Comment 34, supra note 50, at 8 (“Restrictions must not be
overbroad.”); August 2011 La Rue, supra note 52, at 6 (discussing that any restrictions must
be formulated with specific precision).
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restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA.272
Similarly, in Ashcroft, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence suggested that
COPA was likely overbroad and would not survive a constitutional
challenge since content-based regulations like COPA are
presumptively invalid abridgments of speech.273 US First Amendment
jurisprudence remains a safeguard against government attempts at
hard censorship.
While the US Constitution constrains legislative attempts at hard
censorship, soft censorship schemes, such as the DMCA, continue to
evade constitutional scrutiny.274 Although the DMCA does not
expressly limit freedom of expression, the chilling effect is
apparent.275 Recognizing an intermediary’s inclination to err on the
side of safety by over-censoring, Special Rapporteur La Rue advised
that intermediaries may not be in the best position to make
determinations of the legality of particular content.276 This
determination requires careful balancing of competing interests and
consideration of defenses.277 In a 2011 Joint Declaration, the Special
Rapporteurs declared, “intermediaries should not be required to
monitor user-generated content” and should not be subject to

272. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The breadth of
this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy burden on the
Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA.
It has not done so.”).
273. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 591 (2002) (“There is a very real likelihood that
the . . . [COPA] is overbroad and cannot survive such a challenge. Indeed, content-based
regulations like this one are presumptively invalid abridgments of the freedom of speech.”).
274. See Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 890 (arguing that content
restrictions via the spending power generally enables the soft censorship to survive First
Amendment scrutiny); Seltzer, supra note 116, at 176 (arguing that the indirect nature of the
chill on speech should not shield the DMCA from challenge).
275. See infra notes 283-92 (describing the chilling effects caused by § 512).
276. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 12 (arguing that the lack of
transparency in the intermediaries’ decision-making process obscures discriminatory practices
or political pressure affecting the companies’ decisions); cf. Seltzer, supra note 117, at 181
(noting that because the service provider does not share all the benefits of the poster, the
service provider lacks a similarly strong incentive to take risks in defending posted material in
the face of a complaint).
277. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 12 (arguing that intermediaries may
not be in the best position to balance competing interests and consideration of defenses);
Seltzer, supra note 116, at 229 (arguing for an alternative approach that limits takedowns to
claimed commercial appropriation of entire works and requires proof to be submitted along
with the notification).
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extrajudicial takedowns which fail to provide sufficient protection for
freedom of expression.278
It is debatable whether the current DMCA counter-notification
process provides sufficient protection for freedom of expression.279
Despite its purpose to protect copyrights, some critics argue that the
DMCA’s “notice-and-takedown” regime has a chilling effect on
freedom of expression.280 For example, the report of suspected
terrorist organizations using DMCA takedowns of YouTube videos
critical of Islam in efforts to obtain the uploader’s name and address
is troubling.281 One critic notes that the notice-and-takedown regime
shares many of the hallmarks of prior restraints on speech because the
notice-and-takedowns are imposed to limit speech before any formal
adjudication on the merits of the copyright claims.282
Because of the relatively low costs to claimants and the
expectation of prompt takedowns, the DMCA is susceptible to
abusive claims.283 Moreover, because private parties, such as service
providers, remove the content, the DMCA evades the level of scrutiny
typically evoked by government intervention.284 Professor Seltzer
278. See Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et al., Joint
Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet, § 2b, available at http://
www.osce.org/fom/78309 (June 1, 2011) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
279. Some other notice-and-action systems, such as the E-Commerce Directive, do not
include counter-notifications. See supra notes 176-81 (describing the E-Commerce noticeand-action procedure).
280. See Seltzer, supra note 117, at 116 (arguing that the DMCA's indirect chilling effect
upon speech affects the public no less than if the government wrongly ordered the removal of
lawful online material directly); John William Nelson, DMCA Takedowns Versus Free Speech,
LEX TECHNOLOGIAE (October 18, 2010) http://www.lextechnologiae.com/2010/10/18/dmcatakedowns-versus-free-speech/ (discussing how legitimate works can be brought down by
illegitimate DMCA take-down notices because service providers are likely to be risk-averse).
281. See Doble, supra note 120 (reporting the suspected use of DMCA takedowns by
terrorist organizations); Tamburro, supra note 120 (reporting that a Youtuber is hiding from
suspected terrorists after sharing his information pursuant to the DMCA counter-notification
procedures).
282. See Nelson, supra note 281 (arguing that the DMCA framework of prior restraint is
inconsistent with the United States’ notion of free expression); Seltzer, supra note 116, at 190
(arguing for greater constitutional scrutiny of the DMCA because it operates as a prior restraint
on expression). See generally Internet Intermediaries, supra note 18 (recommending
improvements to the current notice-and-takedown regime).
283. See Seltzer, supra note 116, at 178 (“Compounding the problem, the promise of
rapid takedown creates an incentive for copyright claimants to file dubious takedown claims”);
Urban & Quilter, supra note 116, at 624 (2006) (revealing a high incidence of questionable
uses of the § 512 process).
284. See Mike Masnick, Why The DMCA Is An Unconstitutional Restriction On Free
Speech, TECHDIRT (Apr. 6, 2010), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100402/
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notes that the DMCA offers service providers the one-sided choice of
either potentially costly, case-by-case risk analysis of defending each
claim or streamlined self-censorship.285 She posits that a rational, riskaverse entity would likely choose the latter, especially since
potentially only a third party’s speech is at stake.286 This risk-aversion
may surrender valuable speech in the process.287
In an effort to study § 512 of the DMCA’s effect on the First
Amendment, a consortium of law school clinics and the EFF began
the “Chilling Effects Project.”288 Beginning in January 2002, the
project collected cease-and-desist letters on a “variety of intellectual
property and other online-speech-related doctrines such as
defamation.”289 Their study revealed takedowns occurring in
numerous questionable situations.290 For instance, a number of notices
addressed non-copyright issues, such as a competitor’s search engine
ranking, trademark rights, or personal privacy.291 The researchers
determined from their limited data that the effect on Internet speech

1856128861.shtml (arguing that the DMCA violates the First Amendment); Seltzer, supra note
116, at 175-76 (arguing for greater constitutional scrutiny of § 512 because its “indirect
chilling effect upon speech harms the public no less than if the government wrongly ordered
the removal of lawful online material directly.”).
285. See Seltzer, supra note 116, at 175 (arguing that the DMCA incentivizes streamline
censorship).
286. See id.
287. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 12 (noting intermediaries’
inclination to err on the side of safety by over-censoring potentially illegal content); Seltzer,
supra note 116, at 184 (arguing that the market fails to correct this error because a significant
amount of Internet speech is non-commercial and hosted on free or low-margin hosting
services).
288. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 15, at 641; CHILLING EFFECTS http://
www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) [hereinafter CHILLING EFFECTS PROJECT]
(describing the goals of the organization, which is to educate people about the protections that
the First Amendment and intellectual property laws give to your online activities).
289. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 115, at 641. Their data set included 876 notices
submitted to Chilling Effects over a three year period; see also About Us, CHILLING EFFECTS,
(last visited Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.chillingeffects.org/pages/about (discussing the aims of
the project).
290. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 115, at 681 (finding a surprisingly large number of
notices that present serious substantive questions about the underlying claim); see also About
Us, CHILLING EFFECTS, (last visited Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.chillingeffects.org/pages/
about (discussing that many notices are without merit).
291. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 115, at 681 (finding the data quite troubling, since
the legislative history of § 512 were limited to questions of copyright infringement); see also
CHILLING EFFECTS http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (containing a
database of improper takedown complaints, including notices based on trademarks).
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from processes that lack the traditional safeguards of court
proceedings is rather significant.292
B. Article 19 Analysis of the United Kingdom: Who Watches the
Watchdogs?
Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue recognized that an
organization that is independent of any unwarranted influence may
undertake assessment of blocking sites as long as the entity provides
full details regarding the necessity and justification for the
censorship.293 Because the IWF does not directly censor content,
however, it is unclear based on the language of Article 19 whether the
three-part cumulative test applies to the UK government’s
cooperation with the IWF because the IWF does not promulgate laws
or regulations, and the three-part cumulative test appears to apply
only to laws.294 Because the IWF’s “URL list” affects over 95% of
UK Internet users, transparency and accountability are essential from
that institution.295 Not only is the IWF’s “URL list” confidential, but
the IWF also does not publish its findings from its independent
review process.296 A party that receives a notice to takedown or
discovers that its site has been added to the “URL list” may appeal the
IWF’s assessment to the internal appeal board.297 Because the IWF is

292. See Urban & Quilter, supra note 115, at 682 (arguing that the removal of speech
from the Internet without traditional forms of due process is troubling); see also Brief of
Amicus Curiae for Plaintiff-Appellant at 26, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976 (9th
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-56316) (referencing the symposium’s findings).
293. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 20 (calling for increased
transparency in filtering); August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 51 at 13 (discussing the
possibility of independent organizations in determining what material should be blocked).
294. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52, at 8 (stating that any limitation to the
right to freedom of expression must be provided by law, which is clear and accessible to
everyone); August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 51, at 22 (emphasis added) (“Any such
laws must comply with the three criteria of restrictions . . . .”).
295. See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Beginning of the End of Internet Freedom, 45 Geo. J.
Int'l L. 383, 389 (2014) (noting that the United Kingdom has implemented a nationwide
filtering system that affects over 98% of Internet subscribers in the country); CJ Davies, The
Hidden Censors of the Internet, WIRED UK (May 20, 2009), http://www.wired.co.uk/
magazine/archive/2009/06/features/the-hidden-censors-of-the-Internet/viewall (reporting that
reach of the IWF’s blacklist on UK Internet subscribers.)
296. See Edwards, supra note 159 (noting that the IWF does not publish its URL list).
297. See Content Assessment Appeal Process, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://
www.iwf.org.uk/accountability/complaints/content-assessment-appeal-process (last visited
Dec. 31, 2014) (describing IWF’s internal appeal process); Content Assessment Appeal
Process: Chart, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/
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a non-government organization, however, there is no judicial appeal
of the determinations made within the organization.298
The IWF’s “URL list,” at least facially, does not create a
freedom of expression concern because the organization ostensibly
only compiles a blacklist of criminal content, such as child
pornography. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur underscores that
there is a difference between blocking illegal content, which States
parties are required to prohibit under international law, and content
that may be considered harmful, but of which State parties are neither
required to prohibit nor criminalize.299 However, despite the IWF’s
limited involvement in the actual censoring of illegal content, the UK
filtering system essentially grants the ultimate authority over Internet
content to this unaccountable, nontransparent organization.300
The 2008 “IWF and Wikipedia” controversy demonstrated the
possible over-inclusive censorship resulting from major UK ISPs
utilizing the IWF’s “URL list.”301 On December 5, 2008, the IWF
added Wikipedia URLs for “Virgin Killer,” the 1976 album by
German heavy metal band Scorpions, to their blacklist.302 The thirtyaccountability/Content%20assessment%20appeal%20process.pdf (flowchart of IWF appeal
process).
298. See Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, A Human Rights Audit of the Internet Watch
Foundation,
https://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/accountability/Human_Rights_Audit_
web.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (recommending that, based on the rationale in the split
decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court case YL v. Birmingham City Council, IWF’s
assessments should be susceptible to judicial review); see also Davies, supra note 95
(describing IWF’s opaque internal appeals process).
299. See August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 51, at 7 (differentiating content that
must be prohibited by international law and permissible content). See generally Convention on
the Rights of the Child, Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography, art. 3(c), opened for signature May 24, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227 (requiring State
Parties to criminalize the production and dissemination of child pornography).
300. Because UK’s largest ISPs utilize the IWF’s URL list, the effect of the blacklist is
experienced throughout the nation. See IWF URL List Recipients, supra note 158 (providing a
list of ISPs and telecommunications companies that utilize the URL list); Davies, supra note
296 (reporting that Internet content in the United Kingdom is checked against a mysterious,
secret blacklist).
301. See Davies, supra note 295 (reporting on the Wikipedia controversy); see also infra
notes 302-09 (explaining the over-censorship of Wikipedia that resulted from the IWF’s URL
list).
302. See Frank Fisher, A Nasty Sting in the Censors' Tail, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9,
2008),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/dec/09/scorpions-virgin-killercensorship (reporting the controversy over the thirty-year-old album cover); Gordon
MacMillan, Wikipedia Page Banned in UK Over Controversial Child Image, BRAND
REPUBLIC (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.brandrepublic.com/news/868067/Wikipedia-pagebanned-UK-controversial-child-image/ (“An Internet watchdog in the UK has taken the
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two-year-old album cover depicted a nude prepubescent girl.303 The
IWF justified the inclusion of the sites that showed the album cover
because the cover contained “potentially illegal child sexual abuse
image.”304 However, as a result of the block, UK users were unable to
view the page or edit the Wikipedia article, consequently preventing
them from removing the picture.305 ISPs utilizing the “URL list”
would re-route Wikipedia traffic through a proxy server, resulting in
Wikipedia being unable to distinguish UK users from one another by
their IP addresses.306 This influx from a single source triggered
Wikipedia's anti-abuse mechanism, blocking all non-registered UK
users from editing articles.307 Electronic Frontiers Australia vicechairman Colin Jacobs commented that "[the] incident in Britain, in
which virtually the entire country was unable to edit Wikipedia
because the [IWF] had blacklisted a single image on the site,
illustrated the pitfalls of mandatory ISP filtering.”308 Facing a storm
unprecedented step of banning users in Britain from accessing a Wikipedia web page, which
contains an album cover featuring an image of a young nude girl.”); Wikipedia Child Image
Censored, BBC (Dec. 8, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7770456.stm (“Some volunteers
who run Wikipedia said it was not for the [IWF] to censor one of the web's most popular
sites.”).
303. See Claudine Beaumont & Nicole Martin, Wikipedia Ban Lifted by Internet Watch
Foundation, THE TELEGRAPH, (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/
3700396/Wikipedia-ban-lifted-by-Internet-Watch-Foundation.html (reporting on IWF’s
decision to lift the Wikipedia ban resulting from the Scorpions’ Virgin Killer album cover);
Bobbie Johnson, Wikipedia falls foul of British censors, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 7, 2008),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2008/dec/08/wikipedia-censorship (reporting on the
result of IWF’s blacklist of Wikipedia page).
304. Wikipedia Child Image Censored, BBC (Dec. 8, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
7770456.stm (detailing the IWF’s response); see supra notes 303 (reporting on the IWF’s
response to the Wikipedia page).
305. See Censorship of WP in the UK Dec 2008 Q&A, WIKIMEDIA FOUND., http://
wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Censorship_of_WP_in_the_UK_Dec_2008QA (last visited
Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining why UK users were unable to edit the Wikipedia page); Jeremy
Kirk, Wikipedia Article Censored in UK for the First Time, PCWORLD (Dec. 8, 2008), http://
www.pcworld.com/article/155112/wikipedia_censored.html (describing the unintended effects
of blacklisting a Wikipedia article) .
306. Since at least ninety-five percent of UK Internet users subscribe to ISPs that utilize
the IWF’s blacklist, a significant number of UK subscribers were unable to edit the Wikipedia
page. Jeremy Kirk, Wikipedia Article Censored in UK for the First Time, PCWORLD (Dec. 8,
2008), http://www.pcworld.com/article/155112/wikipedia_censored.html; see also supra notes
303-05 (explaining the reason UK users were unable to edit the Wikipedia page).
307. See supra notes 303-06 (describing inadvertent mass blocking resulting from IWF’s
blacklist and Wikipedia’s internal mechanisms).
308. See Asher Moses, Labor Plan to Censor Internet in Shreds, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/news/home/technology/labor-plan-to-censorInternet-in-shreds/2008/12/09/1228584820006.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap1 (reporting
concerns over Australia’s proposal to adopt an Internet censorship system similar to the IWF);
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of controversy, the IWF rescinded the block on December 9, 2008
after conducting its own independent, nontransparent appeal
process.309
In efforts to provide accountability and reassure stakeholders,
the IWF regularly invites independent auditors to inspect the
organization’s processes.310 In November 2013, Lord Ken Macdonald
of River Glaven, Director of Public Prosecution, conducted a human
rights audit of the IWF.311 In his report dated January 27, 2014, Lord
Macdonald recommended several improvements, such as increasing
the transparency in the inspection and appeal process.312 The IWF
adopted seven of the recommendations, including appointing a human
rights expert on the Board and appointing a senior legal figure as the
Chief Inspector of the appeals process.313 While these improvements
would likely improve the IWF processes, the blocking resulting from
ISPs utilizing the IWF’s URL list continues to be opaque.
Further, the trend of graduated response laws has prompted
international attention from human rights scholars.314 Special
Rapporteur La Rue challenged the legitimacy of graduated response
laws, declaring that “[c]utting off subscribers from Internet access, on
see also Colin Jacobs, The Future of Internet Censorship, ELECTRONIC FRONTIERS
AUSTRALIA, (Sept. 21, 2010) (referencing the IWF and Wikipedia incident)..
309. See Jacqui Cheng, IWF Backs off of Scorpions Wikipedia Block After Criticism,
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 9, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2008/12/iwf-backs-off-ofscorpions-wikipedia-block-after-criticism/ (reporting that “the fact that the image is some 32
years old and posted pretty much everywhere on the Internet. . . has prompted the IWF to
remove it from its list of illegal content.”); Richard Korman, British Watchdogs Back Down
Over Wikipedia Image of Nude Girl, ZDNET (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/
government/british-watchdog-backs-down-over-wikipedia-image-of-nude-girl/4214 (reporting
the IWF’s lift of the ban).
310. See Independent Inspection, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/
accountability/independent-inspection (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing the public with
the auditor’s reports); see, e.g., 2013 AUDIT OF THE INTERNET WATCH FOUNDATION (Jul. 19,
2013),
https://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/accountability/IWF%20Hotline%20Audit
%202013.pdf (reporting a satisfactory inspection of the IWF’s processes).
WATCH
FOUND.,
311. See
Human
Rights
Audit,
INTERNET
https://www.iwf.org.uk/accountability/human-rights-audit (last visited Dec. 30, 2014)
(providing the public with the auditor’s reports) (reporting the adoption of several of Lord
Macdonald’s recommendations).
312. See Macdonald, supra note 299, at 25 (“It is critical . . . that IWF’s inspection
process should be transparent and properly designed).
313. Human Rights Audit, INTERNET WATCH FOUND., https://www.iwf.org.uk/
accountability/human-rights-audit (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (reporting the adoption of
several of Lord Macdonald’s recommendations).
314. See, e.g., May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 14 (expressing his deep
concerns over discussions regarding a centralized on/off control over Internet traffic).
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the grounds of violating intellectual property rights law, is completely
disproportionate and subsequently a violation of Article 19, Paragraph
3, of the [ICCPR].”315 The Special Rapporteur urges States Parties to
repeal or amend existing intellectual copyright laws, which permit
users to be disconnected from Internet access, and to refrain from
adopting such laws.316
Prime Minister Cameron’s proposal of default filtering of legal
content raises several human rights issues.317 For example, Special
Rapporteur La Rue noted that “while the protection of children from
inappropriate content may constitute a legitimate aim, the availability
of software filters that parents . . . can use to control access to certain
content renders action by the Government such as blocking less
necessary and difficult to justify.”318 Similarly, Jim Killock, executive
director of the Open Rights Group, explains that default filters may
not be necessary.319 The underlying issue can be addressed by
increasing funds for the policing of the criminals responsible for the
production and distribution of images of child abuse.320 While the
effects of the United Kingdom’s default filter proposal and its
graduated response law can be analyzed under the traditional Article
19 analysis, the UK ISP’s cooperation with a nongovernment
organization muddles the analysis. The narrowed scope of Article
315. Id. at 21.
316. See id.
317. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 10 (stating that States’ use of
blocking or filtering technologies is often in violation of their obligation to guarantee the right
to freedom of expression); Joint Declaration, supra note 279, at 3 (“Content filtering systems
which are imposed by a government or commercial service provider and which are not enduser controlled are a form of prior censorship and are not justifiable as a restriction on freedom
of expression.”).
318. May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 9 (recognizing that advances in
technology are weakening governments’ justifications for censorship based on protecting
children from inappropriate content).
319. See Jim Killock, David Cameron is Issuing Bad Advice to Parents, OPEN RIGHTS
GROUP BLOG (Jul. 22, 2013) https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2013/porn-blocks-edgingaway-from-active-choice (arguing for that the proposed filters are not feasible); Jim Killock,
Help us to Re-start the Debate About Internet Filters, OPEN RIGHTS GROUP BLOG (Apr. 15,
2014),
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2014/help-us-to-restart-the-debate-aboutInternet-filters (launching campaign to raise awareness of the Internet filtering issue).
320. See Killock, supra note 320 (arguing that mandatory filters are not required to
protect children); see also Olly Lenard, Why David Cameron's Internet Censorship Is a
Terrifying and Terrible Idea, HUFFINGTON POST UK BLOG (Jul. 29, 2013, 10: 52 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/olly-lennard/why-david-camerons-intern_b_3653566.html (arguing
that that Prime Minster Cameron’s proposed filtering measures are ineffective, ill-informed
and bound to fail).
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19(3) to laws or actions of the government possibly limits the actions
and decisions of non-government actors, such as ISPs and the IWF,
from the purview of the ICCPR.
C. Article 19 Analysis of China: Examining the “Impregnable
Fortress”
China’s policy of Internet censorship has drawn international
attention and criticism.321 China's content regulation scheme
comprises a morass of statutes, regulations, and decrees from
numerous government entities.322 Although China is a signatory to the
ICCPR, the Chinese government has not ratified the treaty.323
Establishing the potential violations of Article 19 will illuminate the
extent of the PRC’s human rights violations, and subsequently
establish grounds to remedy them. While Article 19(3) permits
restrictions for the protection of national security, public order, health
and morals, these restrictions must comply with the three-part
cumulative test expressed in Article 19(3).324 A closer examination
reveals that the PRC’s regulation of the Internet suffers from
vagueness, disproportional sanctions, and lack of transparency.325
Imprecise language creates difficulty in determining which
speech is permitted and which are prohibited.326 For instance, the
Regulation on Publication Administration provides that “no
321. See e.g., supra notes 216-36 (discussing international criticism of PRC’s control
over their internal Internet activity).
322. See supra Part I.D.1-2 (discussing the methods and effects of China’s manipulation
of the Internet).
323. Signing a treaty is a step towards becoming party to a treaty. See Understanding
International Law Fact Sheet #5, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/
2008/Press_kit/fact_sheet_5_english.pdf (“A State can express its consent to be bound in
several ways . . . the most common ways are: definitive signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval, and accession.”).
Simply signing a treaty, however, does not usually make a State a party. Id. Signing
treaties does, however, create an obligation, in the period between signature and ratification to
refrain in good faith from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Id.
324. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19(3).
325. See infra notes 327-58 (describing the vagueness of various regulations,
disproportional punishment of Internet bloggers and critics, and lack of transparency of the
Golden Shield Project).
326. See Mindy Kristin Longanecker, No Room for Dissent: China's Laws Against
Disturbing Social Order Undermine Its Commitments to Free Speech and Hamper the Rule of
Law, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 373, 398 (2009) (discussing how laws against disturbing
social order are vague and leave citizens and officials without proper guidance as to the laws'
scope); Shao, Internet Speech, supra note 196, at 56-57 (discussing the lack of certainty
caused by vague laws).
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publication” may contain content “harming the honor or the interest
of the nation” and “disturbing social order, disrupting social
stability.”327 What constitutes honor, national interest, social order,
and social stability are not defined.328 Furthermore, the
aforementioned prohibition is also present in numerous statutes such
as the Criminal Law and Decision on Safeguarding Internet
Security.329
In addition, the involvement of various regulatory and licensing
agencies constitutes a form of prior restraint.330 The GAPP requires
all proposed publications on “important topics” to be filed with their
agency.331 The PRC further requires individuals or organizations to
obtain permits in order to lawfully engage in media business.332 The
Regulation on Internet Information Service requires all commercial
327. Chuban Guanli Tiaoli (2011 Xiuding) (出版管理条例(2011修订)) [Regulation on
the Administration of Publication (2011 Revision)] (promulgated by State Council, Mar. 19,
2011, effective Jul. 18, 2013) (Lawinfochina) (China) (failing to delineate the scope of what
constitutes “disturb[ing] the public order or destroy[ing] the public stability.”).
328. See id.; Longanecker, supra note 327, at 399 (noting the lack of definitions of key
terms in PRC regulations).
329. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (97 Xiuding) (中华人民共和国刑法
(97修订)) [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (97 Revision)] (promulgated by
National People's Congress, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1 1997) (Lawinfochina) (China)
(failing to define the terms); Quanguo Rwn Da Chang Weihuì Guanyu Weihu Hulianwang
Anquan De Juedìng (全国人大常委会关于维护互联网安全的决定) [Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Preserving Computer Network
Security] (promulgated by Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Dec. 28,
2000, effective Dec. 28, 2000) (Lawinfochina) (China) (failing to define the terms).
330. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 199, at 54-56 (explaining that China’s
licensing schemes amount to prior restraint); Prior Restraints, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA, http://www.cecc.gov/prior-restraints (last visited Dec. 30, 2014)
(listing the various forms of prior restraint in China).
331. These topics include: literature of the Party or the nation, former or current leaders
of the Party or the nation, Party secrets or state secrets, nationality problems or religious
problems, the Cultural Revolution, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern European bloc. See
[Guanyu Yinfa Tushu Qikan Yinxiang Zhipin Dianzi Chubanwu Zhongda Xuan Tili Beian
Banfa
De
Tongzhi(关于印发(图书、期刊、音像制品、电子出版物重大选题备案办法)
的通知) [Measures on the Recording of Important Topics of Books, Periodicals,
Audio/Visual Productions and Electronic Publications]promulgated by the General Office of
the General Administration of Press, October 10, 1997, effective October 10, 1997),
http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/circular-regarding-the-printing-andpromulgation-of-the-measures-on-the#body-chinese (China); see also Shao, Regulating the
Internet, supra note 199, at 55 (describing the GAPP’s licensing procedures).
332. See, e.g., Hulianwang Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Banfa (互联网信息服务管理办法)
[Regulation on Internet Information Service] (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 25,
2000, effective Jan. 8, 2011) (Lawinfochina) (China) (requiring individuals to obtain a license
before engaging in the media business).

2015]

BRINGING IN A NEW SCALE

879

and non-commercial Internet information services to file with their
local telecommunications regulatory authority.333 Similarly, the
Administration of the Publication of Audio-Visual Programs
stipulates that no one may operate an Internet broadcast business for
news-related audio/visual programs without permission from the State
Council Information Office.334 Consequently, the Chinese
government controls the amount, structure, distribution, and
coordination of publishing and broadcasting within the country.335
Vague language and overbreadth are legal comorbidities.336
Numerous regulations become over-inclusive and prohibit an
expansive set of activities by using imprecise language.337 For
instance, the Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites of
Internet Access Services proscribes that no unit or individual may
utilize the Internet to produce, copy, look up, or transmit information
“damaging the interest of the state.”338 This statute ostensibly
prohibits the use of the Internet to criticize the Chinese
333. See id.
334. Hulianwang Deng Xinxi Wangluo Chuanbo Shi Jiemu Guanli Banfa
(互联网等信息网络传播视听节目管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of the
Publication of Audio-Visual Programs through the Internet] (promulgated by State
Broadcasting, Film and TV Administration, July 6 2004, effective Oct. 11, 2004)
(Lawinfochina) (China) (“The License for Publication of Audio-Visual Programs through
Information Network shall be obtained for undertaking the business of publication of audiovisual programs through information network.”).
335. See Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 200, at 55 (describing the PRC’s
control over publishing and broadcasting). In addition to licensing and reporting schemes, the
Chinese government also proactively takes down search engines, online chat rooms and blog
service providers. See Raymond Li and Kristine Kwok, Popular Forum Rushes to Go Offline
After Closure Order, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jul. 26, 2006), http://www.scmp.com/
article/558028/popular-forum-rushes-go-offline-after-closure-order (reporting that a popular
online forum has been ordered to shut down after mainland authorities began tightening their
grip on the Internet).
336. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 857
(1991) (arguing that vagueness is best analyzed as a subcategory of overbreadth and that
overbreadth principles should govern vagueness issues); Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra
note 202, at 57 (noting that vagueness and overbreadth are often overlapping).
337. See Longanecker, supra note 327, at 399 (noting that when the laws present
ambiguous terms without any guidance for government officials or citizens, Chinese police
and courts interpret these terms inconsistently); Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 200,
at 57 (explaining that vague laws risk selective enforcement and may proscribe a broad range
of activities).
338. Hulianwang
Shangwang
Fuwu
Yingye
Changsuo
Guanli
Tiaoli
(互联网上网服务营业场所管理条例) [Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites
of Internet Access Services] (promulgated by State Council, Sept. 29, 2002, effective Nov. 15,
2002) (Lawinfochina) (China), art. 14 (prohibiting the use of the Internet to harm the social
ethics or the excellent cultural traditions of the nationalities).
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government.339 While the Supreme People's Court and Supreme
People's Procuratorate have issued various interpretation guidelines,
this does not solve the underlying problem of vague regulations and
instead only amounts to a short fix to a deeper problem.340
The government’s control over the Internet is further reinforced
by the installation of the Great Firewall of China.341 The firewall
raises numerous potential Article 19 violations, including preventing
citizens from receiving and seeking information.342 For instance, a
search for “Human Rights Watch” on a Chinese ISP will return an
error page.343 Unlike other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, where
blocked content is redirected to a page explaining the reason why the
content is blocked, access to restricted content in China only informs
the user that “connection was reset.”344 Therefore, intentional
censorship is difficult to distinguish from a technical error.345
The PRC recently increased surveillance of Internet activity,
specifically microblogs, which are more concise and thematic
versions of traditional blogs.346 The threat of harsh sanctions can exert
339. See id.
340. See 2010 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 210 (attempting to give guidance to
government officials regarding the scope of pornography laws); Longanecker, supra note 327,
at 399 (arguing that in order restore legitimacy of certain laws, China needs to address the
vague terminology).
341. See Lyombe Eko, Anup Kumar & Qingjiang Yao, Google This: The Great Firewall
of China, the It Wheel of India, Google Inc., and Internet Regulation, 15 J. INTERNET L. 3, 5
(2011) (“The Great Firewall Wall of China is a massive, sophisticated, national censorship
system that uses a number of techniques . . . to automatically control and restrict the stream of
Internet communication entering or leaving China . . . .”); Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra
note 200, at 43 (explaining China’s use of a variety of technical measures to filter content).
342. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19(1)(2).
343. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 391 (explaining China’s lack of
openness regarding their use of filters); “Race to the Bottom” Corporate Complicity in
Chinese Internet Censorship, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Aug. 2006, Vol. 8 No. 8, 10-11
[hereinafter Race to the Bottom] (describing the extent of the PRC’s control over the Internet
at the router-level).
344. Race to the Bottom, supra note 343, at 11 (discussing that governments differ in
their attempts to inform the Internet user about blocked content); see Bambauer, Cybersieves,
supra note 21, at 391-92 (juxtaposing the openness of Saudi Arabia’s use of filters with the
lack of openness of Great Firewall of China); Alfred Hermida, Saudis Block Two Thousand
Websites, BBC (Jul. 31, 2002) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2153312.stm (reporting
that the Saudis are also open about their censorship of the web).
345. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 391 (noting that intentional
censorship is difficult to distinguish from technical errors); Race to the Bottom, supra note
344, at 10 (explaining the China’s filters causes an error message to appear in the users’
browser when they searched for blocked content).
346. See Chen, supra note 20, at 250 (discussing the extent of Internet monitoring in
China); China Employs Two Million Microblog Monitors State Media Say, BBC (Oct. 4,
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a significant chilling effect on the right to freedom of expression.347
China currently leads the word in number of arrested Internet users,
coined “netizens.”348 Among the current prisoners are a Nobel Peace
Prize winner and number of human rights activists.349
On January 31, 2005, Changsha’s prosecutorial office, the
People’s Procuratorate of Changsha, Hunan, filed charges against Shi
Tao for illegally providing state secrets outside the country.350 Shi
Tao was the head of the Editorial Department of Hunan’s
Contemporary Business News and used his personal Yahoo! e-mail
account to send allegedly top-secret documents to the Asia
Democracy Foundation, a website located in New York that
advocates for democracy in China.351 Shi Tao was sentenced to ten
years imprisonment with two years of subsequent deprivation of
political rights.352 This case garnered worldwide attention because an
American corporation, Yahoo!, aided in Shi Tao’s arrest by willingly
disclosing details of Shi Tao’s email to the Chinese government.353
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24396957 (reporting the expansion of
China’s Internet monitoring task force).
347. See John D. Zelezny, COMMUNICATION LAW: LIBERTIES, RESTRAINT AND
MODERN MEDIA 50-51 (6th ed. 2011) (explaining that subsequent punishment may chill
expression as much as prior restraints); Shao, Regulating the Internet, supra note 200, at 56
(noting that when punishment is overly harsh, the prospects of subsequent sanctions may serve
to chill expression as much as prior orders not to publish).
348. See Internet Enemies 2012 – China, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 12, 2012)
https://en.rsf.org/china-china-12-03-2012,42077.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (reporting
the waves of blogger and “netizen” arrests); see also China Arrests Blogger for Twitter Joke,
THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/21/chinaarrest-blogger-twitter-joke (reporting an arrest of a Chinese Twitter user for making jokes
about the Chinese Congress).
349. Liu Xiaobo, a professor, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and human rights activist, is
currently incarcerated as a political prisoner in China. See Mark Mcdonald, An Inside Look at
China’s Most Famous Political Prisoner, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jul. 23, 2012) http://
rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/23/an-inside-look-at-chinas-most-famous-politicalprisoner/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (reporting about Liu Xiaobo’s sentence for seeking
democractic reforms); Internet Enemies 2011 – China, REPS. WITHOUT BORDERS (March 11,
2011) available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d822690c.html (Reporting on human rights
activist, Hu Jia’s, sentence for inciting subversion of state power).
350. See Shi Tao (Hunan Province, Changsha Intermediate People’s Ct. 2003) [April 27,
2005], available at http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/wp-content/ShiTao_verdict.pdf (finding
that defendant Shi Tao intentionally and illegally provided information that he knew to be topsecret level state secrets to an entity outside of the country); Shao, Internet Speech, supra note
196, at 79-82 (summarizing the Shi Tao case).
351. See supra note 350 (describing the Shi Tao case).
352. Id.
353. See Shyu, supra note 224, at 228 (“Because he sent the email from his Yahoo!
account, China requested, and Yahoo! Hong Kong delivered, information on Shi Tao's
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Moreover, the reported treatment of political prisoners may also
cause a chilling effect on speech.354 For instance, cyber-dissident
Zhang Jianhong, better known under his pen name Li Hong, died of
complications from a disease that was untreated during three years in
prison for writing articles critical of the Chinese government.355 The
incarceration of bloggers and cyber-dissidents clearly runs afoul with
proportionality principles of Article 19.356
The analysis in Part II demonstrates that Article 19 is not
adequate to tackle the modern challenges presented by the
government. US and UK intellectual property laws present collateral
effects on expression that are not easily analyzed under Article 19.
Moreover, it is also unclear about Article 19’s scope vis-à-vis the
active role of nongovernment organization in the Internet censorship.
However, an Article 19 analysis is clearest when dealing with a
totalitarian government, such as the PRC.
III. ARTICLE 19 NEEDS HELP TO STAY RELEVANT IN THE
INTERNET AGE
While the HRC’s interpretations helps to construe the scope of
Article 19, the margin of discretion that is potentially accorded to
nations exemplifies the difficulty of analyzing countries with

location.”); Undermining Freedom of Expression in China, AMNESTY INT’L, (July 2006),
http://www.ethicsworld.org/corporatesocialresponsibility/PDF%20links/Amnesty.pdf
(reporting on the treatment of Shi Tao and his family by the government).
354. See Mayton, supra note 11, at 253-54 (explaining how subsequent punishment may
chill freedom of expression); Zelezny, supra note 348, at 50-51 (describing the effects of
subsequent punishment on speech).
355. See Zhang Jianhong (Pen Name: Li Hong), PEN AMERICA, http://www.pen.org/
defending-writers/test-first-name-test-middle-name-test-last-name/zhang-jianhong-pen-nameli-hong (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (“Zhang Jianhong’s condition worsened considerably due
to a prolonged lack of medical care, and repeated applications for medical parole were denied
despite his declining health.”); Richard Finney, Cyber-Dissident Dies on Parole, RADIO FREE
ASIA (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/dissident-01052011131836.html
(“An outspoken Chinese cyber-dissident has died after suffering from an untreated medical
condition in jail, according to friends.”).
356. See UN General Comment 34, supra note 51 (requiring State to invoke a legitimate
ground in order to restrict the right to freedom of expression); May 2011 La Rue Report, supra
note 52, at 11 (affirming Human Rights Council declaration that restrictions should never be
applied, inter alia, to discussion of Government policies and political debate, and reporting on
human right).
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divergent laws and norms.357 This difficulty created by transnational
norms is further exacerbated when the Internet is involved.
Moreover, although Article 19 was drafted with the foresight to
accommodate future technology, the Internet has developed into a
phenomenon that cannot be adequately governed by traditional media
laws.358 For instance, the absolute language in Article 19, Paragraph
2, can lead to possible conflicts for countries that are also parties to
the WIPO Treaty and the Berne Convention.359 While these
international copyright agreements do not explicitly require
implementing a notice-and-action regime, numerous governments
have adopted this type of intermediary liability system.360 This
growing trend of intermediary liability has caused the Special
Rapporteurs and the HRC to recognize that current notice-and-action
systems are likely incompatible with Article 19.361
In order to adapt international human rights law to the new
challenges presented by the Internet, Article 19 should be
supplemented by parts of Professor Bambauer’s process-based
framework delineated in Cybersieves. This metric utilizes normative
criterion for analyzing a censorship system: openness, narrowness,
transparency, and accountability.362 Although Article 19 already
incorporates similar principles, the enumerated principles only
establish baseline rights and a positive duty for State members to
promote access to the Internet.363

357. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Hertzberg Commc’n, supra note 238 (“There is no
universally applicable common standard. Consequently, in this respect, a certain margin of
discretion must be accorded to the responsible national authorities.”); Legg, supra note 242, at
141 (“One of the most powerful criticisms of the margin of appreciation doctrine is that it
panders to relativist notions of human rights law, which ought to be universal.”).
358. See May 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 53, at 8 (emphasizing that due to the
unique characteristics of the Internet, regulations which may be deemed legitimate for
traditional media are often not so with regard to the Internet).
359. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19(2).
360. See supra notes 113-19 (discussing the DMCA); supra notes 176-81 (discussing the
E-Commerce Directive).
361. See generally Joint Declaration, supra note 279, § 2(a-b) (declaring that no one
“should be liable for content generated by others, which is disseminated using those services,
as long as they do not specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey a court order to
remove that content, where they have the capacity to do so”); May 2011 La Rue Report, supra
note 53, at 11 (noting that intermediary liability systems are subject to abuse).
362. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390-411 (establishing the
framework).
363. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 19.
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As demonstrated by the limited HRC cases, the protection of
these rights is muddled by divergent norms and values.364 Unlike the
text of Article 19, an analysis under the framework does not rely
solely on asking why a country regulates Internet content, for which
there are possibly infinite reasons, but instead the framework asks
how the country regulates the Internet.365 Moreover, because the
metric
encompasses
culturally-neutral
normative
values,
incorporating these aims will improve the analysis of different
countries’ Internet governance. The metric essentially converts
abstract principles into concrete, measurable evaluations.
The first criterion is openness. The framework looks to whether
the country admits to the filtering and clearly describes the
justifications for such filters.366 In other words, openness assesses
whether a state discloses why it censors. Censorship that is disclosed
and explained is likely to be seen as more legitimate than covert
censorship.367 Openness is readily achievable with the current state of
filters.368 For instance, Saudi Arabia’s Internet filters redirect blocked
content to a webpage that informs the Internet user about the
country’s censorship policy.369
The second criterion is transparency. While transparency and
openness are concomitant, transparency relates to the opacity of the
specific content that is filtered and the criteria that the government
uses to delineate prohibited content from permissible content.370
Transparent filtering allows end-users to assess how the blacklist
364. See supra notes 237-41 (discussing the HRC’s lack of progress in respects to
freedom of expression cases).
365. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390 (describing that the goal of the
framework is to evaluate how well a country describes what it censors).
366. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390 (explaining the openness
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 900-06 (analyzing specific soft
censorship models under the Framework).
367. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 390-92 (discussing the standard of
openness); see also Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 900-01 (discussing the
general lack of openness of soft censorship resulting from government persuasion).
368. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 392 (discussing that current filtering
technology can display a block page when a user is prevented from accessing banned
material); Saudi Internet Rules, supra note 246 (proscribing specific Internet activities and
content).
369. See Race to the Bottom, supra note 344, at 11 (noting that attempting to access
blocked webpages in Saudi Arabia will redirect users to an information page); Saudi Internet
Rules, supra note 246 (notifying users of the prohibited content).
370. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 393 (explaining the transparency
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 902-03 (discussing the lack of
transparency in soft censorship methods).
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conforms to the government's justifications for information control.371
Moreover, the transparency criterion can also apply to copyright laws.
For instance, a transparent notice-and-action system discloses its
criteria and publicly records its notices. Despite Article 19’s similar
requirements of openness and transparency, the framework provides
for a more detailed, concrete guideline for analyzing a system’s
openness and transparency.
The third criterion, narrowness, analyzes the accuracy of what a
country actually blocks to the government's description of its
censorship.372 Narrowness examines both over-inclusiveness and
under-inclusiveness censorship.373 Over-inclusive censorship can be
deliberate or inadvertent.374 For instance, inadvertent filtering can
result from classification errors.375 The Golden Shield Project, on the
other hand, exemplifies deliberate over-inclusive censorship because
it utilizes sophisticated content-filtering technology that purportedly
blocks any websites containing selected keywords.376
Under-inclusive censorship occurs when users can routinely
reach banned content.377 The CleanFeed system is an example of
under-inclusive filters because the CleanFeed system utilizes the
IWF’s URL list, which requires regular updates from citizen
reports.378 Consequently, the filters are a step behind the creators of
illegal content. Some argue that under-inclusiveness harms the

371. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 393 (discussing the transparency
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 902-03 (discussing the lack of
transparency in soft censorship methods).
372. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 396 (detailing the narrowness
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 903-06 (arguing that soft
censorship methods also typically fare poorly on the narrowness criterion).
373. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 396-401 (discussing over and underinclusive censorship); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 903-06 (discussing how
soft-censorship methods can be either over and under-inclusive).
374. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 397 (giving examples of overinclusive censorship); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 903-06 (discussing the
effects of inadvertent over-inclusive soft-censorship methods).
375. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 397 (discussing examples of
inadvertent over-inclusive filtering).
376. See supra notes 216-27 (discussing the rationale behind implementing the Great
Firewall of China).
377. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 396-99 (giving examples of underinclusive censorship); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 903-06 (arguing that
various forms of soft censorship models can also be under-inclusive).
378. See supra notes 150-64 (explaining the IWF process and the CleanFeed
mechanism).
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legitimacy of the Internet censorship regime.379 For instance, during
the IWF-Wikipedia incident, one of the leading criticisms of the IWF
was that the blocked album cover could be accessed elsewhere on the
Internet.380 Because of the constant advancement of technology and
the continual growth of the Internet’s seemingly endless expanse,
however, moderate levels of under-inclusiveness is to be expected,
and should be tolerated.
The inclusion of the narrowness metric to the current Article 19
analysis will also allow for a clearer understanding of the chilling
effects caused by copyright laws. For instance, by collecting and
examining empirical data of a notice-and-action system, auditors will
be able to determine the accuracy of a system’s process and
extrapolate inferences about its effect on Internet speech.381
The final criterion is accountability, which takes into account the
degree that citizens influence censorship policy.382 Accountability is
further divided into citizen participation, specification of authority,
opportunity to challenge, and counter-majoritarian constraints.383 This
criterion creates problems when applied to non-democratic countries.
The sub-prongs are intrinsically tied to democratic ideals and, as a
result, a positive analysis of the final criterion relies heavily on
whether the country is democratic.384 Professor Bambauer offers
Saudi Arabia, a monarchy, as a counterexample by referencing the

379. See, e.g., Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 398-99 (“filtering that fails to
block forbidden material--especially badly flawed or nominal blocking--undercuts the
justification for restricting access.”); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 904-05
(discussing the failure of New York Governor Cuomo’s persuasion-based soft-censorship).
380. See supra notes 301-09 (describing the IWF-Wikipedia incident).
381. See, e.g., Urban & Quilter, supra note 116, at 624 (describing efforts from different
organizations on gathering information on notice-and-takedown requests and examining the
data); CHILLING EFFECTS PROJECT, supra note 289 (studying cease and desist letters
concerning online content).
382. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 400 (discussing the accountability
criterion); Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, supra note 10, at 927 (discussing that while SOPA
and PIPA fare poorly on the other criterion, the acts of Congress score well on the
accountability criterion).
383. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 400-01 (discussing the accountability
criterion).
384. Experts have regarded accountability and citizen participation as key elements of a
democratic society. See, e.g., August 2011 La Rue Report, supra note 52 (noting that civic
participation is conducive to a democratic society); Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at
404-10 (discussing how several select nondemocratic countries fail at several aspects of
accountability).
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country’s citizen participation in Internet censorship. 385 However,
because of the limited political participation in the country, Saudi
Arabia fares poorly on the remaining sub-prongs, such as opportunity
to challenge and counter-majoritarian restraints. While accountability
is important, imposing democratic virtues on non-democratic
governments is counter-productive. Non-democratic State parties will
likely fare poorly in the accountability analysis, and requiring those
governments to adhere to democratic ideals may be seen as attempts
at undermining the nation’s sovereignty. This Note is not arguing that
non-democratic governments are intrinsically incompatible with the
accountability criterion; rather that the international community
should not impose the aforementioned democratic principles on
countries that are not ready to transition into a democracy. For these
reasons, accountability should be the least weighed factor.
Furthermore, Professor Bambauer is correct to recognize that a
framework is only as useful as its implementation.386 In order to
determine the weight given to each criterion, he argues that
competition between public and private stakeholders is most efficient
method to develop the most efficient version of the framework.387
Professor Bambauer further argues that while there are other means of
implementation, such as collaboration between stakeholders, and a
top-down process, they present various challenges.388 For instance,
collaboration between parties may lead to gridlock or conflicts of
interest, while a top-down implementation may unintentionally
promote the stakeholder’s concept on free expression.389
Despite Professor Bambauer’s reservation on designating the
implementation process to a single entity, this Note argues that topdown implementation can be more expedient, efficient, and neutral
than the other methods with the correct stakeholder. Since the HRC is
385. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 21, at 404 (referencing Saudi Arabia as a
country that permits only limited political participation but invites citizen participation in
respect to Internet censorship).
386. Id. at 410 (recognizing the importance of effective implementation for the
possibility of the framework’s success).
387. Id. at 414 (arguing that with competition, proposed metrics should get better and
fewer over time).
388. As the name suggests, the collaborative models involve various stakeholders
collaborating on the implementation of the framework. Id. at 416-17 (describing the
collaborative model). The top-down model involves a powerful stakeholder to press for the
framework’s adoption. Id. at 416-17 (discussing the top-down model).
389. Id. at 416-17 (explaining the various defects of each alternative models of
implementing the metric).
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an independent organization comprised of individuals from various
countries and recognized for their human rights achievements, it is a
capable organization to develop and adopt the framework.390
Moreover, the HRC is already tasked with the analytic review of
reports and releases observations based on its findings.391
CONCLUSION
Each country’s method of Internet censorship is to an extent
different and idiosyncratic.392 The United States relies heavily on
removing content through private action.393 The United Kingdom, on
the other hand, cooperates with a non-government organization to
formulate a blacklist.394 Lastly, China exercises unilateral domination
over its internal Internet activity.395 The process of supplementing
Article 19 with Professor Bambauer’s framework arguably will
provide the HRC and the global community with more concrete and
defined normative aims for their Internet regulatory practice. This is a
step towards a global standard for Internet regulation.

390. See Carlson, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the roles and capabilities of the HRC);
Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, supra note 36 (describing the role of the HRC); HRC
Fact Sheet 15, supra note 44, at 12-14 (describing the HRC’s role).
391. See Carlson, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the HRC’s compliance mechanisms);
HRC Fact Sheet 15, supra note 44, at 14-30 (describing the HRC’s monitoring function).
392. See supra Part I.B-D (examining different country’s Internet censorship schemes).
393. See supra Part I.B (examining the United States’ legislative-based model).
394. See supra Part I.C (examining the United Kingdom’s Internet governance model).
395. See supra Part I.D (examining China’s extensive regulation of the Internet).

